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ARTICLES
HOW LAW CAN BE DETERMINATE

Kent Greenawalt*

INTRODUCTION

This Article, part of a longer study, considers one problem
about the objectivity of law. 1 The problem is whether the law as it
•

Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. I am

grateful to Larry Crocker, Charles Larmore, Michael Perry, Peter Strauss, and Jamie
Titus for very helpful suggestions. and to students at seminars at Columbia and New
York University Law Schools at which earlier drafts were discussed.
1. The longer study of which this Article is a part considers the relationship be·
tween "legal" standards and sources of evaluation I loosely call broader. I ask if law is,
or can be, "objective" because it is anchored in correct political morality, economic
efficiency, cultural morality, or some other criterion. For legal cases with no easy answer, the possibility that the law provides one correct answer is closely tied to the law's
relationship with these broader. standards, including the relationship between legal reasoning and the reasoning used to apply these standards.
The longer study also analyzes a range of questions about whether law treats people in an "objective" way. Law might be objective in: 1) addressing external acts, not
thoughts and emotions; 2) taking acts as they reasonably appear, rather than examining
intents, motives, and understandings; 3) viewing acts in light of what "reasonable people" would be expected to do, not in light of what the particular individuals might do;
and 4) establishing criteria of liability and designing remedies and punishments with
regard to general classes of people rather than individuals. I also address issues about
the "objectivity" of categorizations that appear "neutral" in some respect but operate to
the disadvantage of important groups, and I discuss the concern that the whole enterprise of abstract categorization may reflect a harsh, unbending "masculine" perspective
that is harmful for human beings.
My treatment of these topics is an expansion of three Rosenthal lectures, delivered
at Northwestern University Law School in March, 1988. It will appear as a book entitled LAW AND OBJECTIVITY, to be published by Oxford University Press late in 1991.
This Article is an expanded version of the first lecture. I have tried to maintain the
conversational style, and although paying more attention to competing positions here
than in the lecture, I have not attempted either the full analysis or ample citation of a
systematic academic discussion.
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exists provides determinate answers to many legal questions for
judges, other officials, and citizens. I emphasize the word many.
This Article does not focus on "hard cases" and then ask whether
single correct answers for them exist. It does not inquire whether in
some complicated sense all legal questions have determinate answers. 2 This is a treatment of easy legal questions. To most law~
yers, it may seem self-evident that many legal questions do have
determinate answers; and that indeed is what I believe. Feeling
confident about that conclusion, however, is simpler than explaining how law is determinate. I try to show how law often yields
determinate answers, using a fairly strict interpretation of a determinate answer.
A preliminary question I need to address is whether such determinacy of law is important. No doubt, it matters which factors
judges should take into account and whether their authority to resolve significant practical issues is warranted. But if those problems
are resolved, perhaps we should not worry too much about whether
"the law" provides answers or where "the law" ends and other
things begin. Much is sound in this objection. When one addresses
the most complicated issues of interpretation, saying where law
ends is difficult and determining whether "the law" provides answers does not always seem to be of great moment.
Nonetheless, a good deal is at stake in the problem about a
determinate law. The "naive" vision of a legal system is that the
law does yield many answers and that finding an answer does not
depend on a particular individual's moral or political values or his
or her perspectives about interpretation. Certainly this vision is
caught by the traditional idea of a "rule of law, not men." The
right answer does not depend on something idiosyncratic about the
person who is deciding, or on controversial moral and political
claims that are the stuff of debate in the legislative process.
Whether this vision of a rule of law, not of individuals, is just an
illusion does matter. Suppose legal decision is essentially indistinguishable from decisions based on ordinary moral and political arguments, at best the product of a highly deliberative process for
considering such arguments. Then the idea that there is something
special, more solid, about the law should be dispelled, or seen
through clear eyes as a false myth that is useful for the elite or for a
supine and ignorant populace. For some writers, revelation of the
2. I address that problem in the longer study.
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character of judicial decision exposes the power of the judiciary as
illegitimate. 3
Here the "rule of law" idea connects to my basic standard for a
determinate answer. The main criterion for judging the existence of
a determinate answer is whether virtually any intelligent person familiar with the legal system would conclude, after careful study,
that the law provides that answer. This standard reflects well the
notion that the answer exists independently of either individual idiosyncracies or controversial moral and political judgments. I emphasize that this is a rough criterion for seeing if the law really does
provide an answer in some simple, indisputable sense. I am not asserting that somehow the agreement automatically constitutes such
an answer. My focus is on the normative question of whether the
law requires a particular answer, not_ on the factual question of
whether the answer's being arrived at is highly probable. Reasonable people might agree on an answer that was incorrect or not required. But almost universal agreement that an answer is required
is strong evidence of such an answer, given the nature of law. To
cover the possibility of misjudgment, I add as a further criterion of
a determinate answer that no powerful argument consonant with
the broad premises of a legal system exists for a contrary answer.
Whether there are determinate answers in the law meeting these
joint criteria does matter for our understanding of a legal system.
A main target of the Article are skeptics who worry that answers to legal questions are rarely, if ever, determinate. Drawing
from legal realists, some modern writers have emphasized the indeterminacy of legal norms. 4 Often a central aspect of their critique
has been an assertion that the language and content of legal rules
are open to a wide spectrum of interpretations. If that thesis is
sound, perhaps objective legal answers cannot be derived from authoritative rules. If the application of any single rule is indeterminate, questions that invoke broad sets of rules and principles are not
likely to be determinate either. If the language and content of law
are indeterminate, those who decide legal cases may not be much
3. Allan C. Huchinson says, for example, "The indeterminacy critique is fatal to
the legitimacy of the current adjudication enterprise, but it is not damaging to democracy." Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinism: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43
U. MIAMI L. REV. 541 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 247-48
(1984); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
14-19 (1984); see also D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision? 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513, 514, 521, 530-32 (1989). In discussions after my first
lecture at Northwestern, Professor D' Amato strongly challenged my position.
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different from legislators and from executives exercising discretion.
They may make political judgments that carry the day only because
of their political authority. In that event, much legal decision differs little from unguided political decision.
I argue that any extreme thesis that "the law" is always or
usually indeterminate is untenable. Is rebutting that thesis challenging a straw man? Does anyone really think the law usually fails
to provide answers to legal questions, in a sense of "fails" that has
practical significance? I am not sure. I do know able students and
scholars that I respect have defended the position vigorously. Detached passages in some articles seem to suggest the position, even if
the authors do not actually adhere to it. The subject generates
enough misunderstanding to make it worth establishing that the law
does often and uncontroversially provide determinate answers to
legal questions.
My second aim is to explain how one can conceive the existence of determinate answers without relying on highly controversial
assumptions about truth or value. 5 Many of those who believe in
5. No conceptualization can be wholly uncontroversial, and mine is not. Two
clarifications are in order. I adopt an approach that is substantially "conventional"
about the meaning of language and the significance of legal practices, words, and concepts. Some of what I say may ~ot be compatible with what may be called a philosophical realist approach to legal judgment (not to be confused with a legal realist approach,
which lies at the other end of the spectrum). Under that approach, judgment in law
largely consists of ascertaining true moral and political positions to which the words of
legal standards point. See, e.g., Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990);
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 871 (1989). I do not in what follows make general arguments against a competing
realist view of the matters I discuss. Perhaps it is enough to say here (1) that a realist
view is fairly unusual today, (2) that it is not one on which skeptics can rely in challenging my position (except perhaps to show that no shared understanding about law, or our
law, exists), and (3) that were one to accept a realist approach there would be clearly
determinate answers to many cases, and the overlap of clearly determinate answers
under that approach and my approach would be very great.
The relation between what I say and Ronald Dworkin's account of "conventionalism" and law as integrity, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), is a bit more complicated. I definitely do not mean to endorse what Dworkin calls conventionalism, with
. its view that "law" is restricted to what is conventionally settled. Nor do I mean to
reject Dworkin's fundamental idea that judges are involved in an effort to interpret legal
materials that may properly lead them on some occasions to reject views about the
content of law that are then widely accepted. I think that respect for what is widely
accepted (because it is widely accepted) mixes with other elements as bases for decisions, as I explain in Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L. REv. 621, 658-71 (1987). Dworkin's own emphasis on coherence in the Jaw,
on "fairness" in deferring to widely held opinions, and on the place of paradigms in
legal thought gives a significant place to convention (or something very close to it) in
judicial decision. I suspect that Dworkin's concentration on hard cases and the kind of
imaginative reconstruction required for them tends to understate the place convention
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determinate answers are not sure how to defend their beliefs. I
show how the law yields many indisputably correct answers.
This Article has three major divisions. In the first division
(Parts I and II), I offer variations on two nonlegal illustrations that
raise normative questions in social contexts and help suggest a
number of important theoretical points about determinate answers.
I move from individual imperatives, to collective imperatives, to
rules addressed to many people and circumstances. I do not suppose
that conclusions based on nonlegal illustrations can be easily transposed to the law, and I want to be clear that I am not claiming such
a transposition. However, nonlegal illustrations have a double
value. They force us to see whether skepticism about the determinacy of law is based on skepticism about language and rules in general or rests instead on something peculiar about the law. The
simpler examples also compel attention to any features of legal systems that might justify greater skepticism than is warranted for the
examples.
The Article's second division (Parts III-VII) addresses the determinacy of legal standards. I first argue that the answer to the
question of whether certain actions and events carry particular legal
consequences is often clearly negative and that any thesis which asserts that answers to legal questions are invariably indeterminate is
incorrect. I suggest that the percentage of instances in which answers are determinate cannot be assessed by looking at decided
cases or appellate opinions and that the percentage of determinate
answers is substantial. I briefly explore the implications of this conclusion for the legitimacy of law and courts. I then address a simple
statute and show how its application can be determinate-why a
court is required by law, including customary understandings of the
judicial role, to reject various conceivable arguments for nonapplication. Next, considering possible sources of doubt about determinate answers, notably uncertainties with respect to factual
conclusions and the role of courts, and discretionary enforcement
powers, I indicate why these do not undermine possibilities for determinate answers. I point out that even when a legal answer is
determinate, people, including officials, may have moral reasons for
acting contrary to law. Nevertheless, since officials have explicitly
has as an overall source of judicial decision within his own thought; but it may well be
that I think convention has a larger role than he does. In any event, I am confident that
the practical conclusions I draw about determinate answers would not be affected by use
of Dworkin's imaginatively constructed judge Hercules, considering what Dworkin actually says about how Hercules would approach cases.
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or implicitly promised to act in accordance with law, they have at
least one important moral reason for complying with their responsibilities. In the ensuing discussion, I extend the analysis to encompass broader legal standards that do not require results in precise
language. Even for these, determinate answers can exist when all
plausible arguments support the same outcome, as I show with respect to a statutory general justification defense, some claims of
constitutional right, and common law standards.
The primary focus of the first two divisions of the Article is on
specific illustrations and conclusions, a focus that conforms with my
belief that in political and legal philosophy judgments so formed are
more to be trusted than reliance on grand abstractions. The third
division (Part VIII) moves from this focus to address the relevance
of interpretation in other disciplines for legal interpretation. Analogies are illuminating but also potentially misleading if one does not
attend to important differences. Attention to these differences
reveals why determinate answers to legal questions are more common than determinate answers to questions put in some other interpretive disciplines.

I.
A.
1.

DIRECTIVES AND RULES IN BUSINESS SETTINGS

The Determinacy of Simple Imperatives
The Basic Thesis

When Sam enters the office of his boss, Beth, she says, "Good
morning, Sam. Please shut the door." Beth has used imperative
language; her words are directed toward Sam's performing an action. 6 If nothing in Beth's tone of voice7 or in Sam's past relations
with Beth suggests other than a straightforward significance to
Beth's words, 8 Sam has a pretty clear idea what he needs to do to
comply with the directive. He is supposed to walk to the door of
Beth's office and shut it immediately. Sam's understanding does not
depend on any prior relationship between Beth and Sam; he will
know what to do even if it is his or Beth's first day on the job. This
example demonstrates an obvious point: imperative language can be
substantially determinate in context.
6. The word "please" might indicate a request that Sam is free not to perform.
However, coming from a boss to a subordinate in typical settings, a "request" like this
amounts to a directive, one that the subordinate is required by his position to perform.
7. Her tone of voice, for instance, might indicate a joke.
8. "Shutting the door" might mean cutting losses on a project Sam is supervising.
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How is this possible? First, Beth and Sam share a linguistic
competence in English. Both understand the significance that English speakers assign to the words "shut" and "door" and to the syntax and tone of voice in which imperative utterances usually are
formulated. But more than an understanding of English is needed.
Beth has said "the" door and she has not specified when she wants
it closed. Suppose that Sam's own office door and th~ door to a
cabinet within Beth's reach are both open. How does Sam know
Beth means the door to her office? He knows this because people
often want their office doors closed when important matters are to
be discussed; and most people do not ask others to close cabinet
doors within their own easy reach. (Matters could be otherwise; if
all office doors in the firm were rigidly set in open positions, Sam
might look for a door he was capable of closing.) Sam knows further that in contexts like this, a request to close the door means
right away. What is more, Beth is confident that Sam has this
knowledge, and consequently, she feels no need to specify which
door is to be closed and when. In some sense, Sam must construe
Beth's words, and Beth, in turn, intuitively relies on Sam's almost
certain interpretation when she formulates her words. 9 But the effectiveness of Beth's communication does not depend on anything
idiosyncratic about her or Sam; indeed, it is the understanding that
they share with people generally that makes it so easy for Sam and
others to recognize what Sam must do to comply. If Sam w~ks
over to the door and shuts it, he has complied with Beth's directive.
If, in full command of his faculties, he sits down in a chair and
doesn't budge for five minutes, he has failed to coinply. 10 If he
walks behind Beth's desk and shuts her cabinet door, he is either
crazy or playing some joke, but he has also failed to comply.
Our example indicates how the significance of· an imperative
commonly depends upon both shared linguistic competence and
shared assumptions about the social universe people inhabit; it also
illustrates how some forms of action in response to an imperative
can determinatively, or objectively, be said to comply with the imperative while other forms of action can determinatively, or objectively, be said to fail to comply.
9. If a four-year-old child had just entered, Beth might feel a need to be more
explicit about which door is to be shut.
10. He may not have heard Beth or understood her words. Only if further words
between Sam and Beth establish that he understood her request will it be clear to others
that he has consciously declined to comply.
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Instances in Which Compliance Is Doubtful

On some occasions, whether Sam has complied or not with
Beth's directive may be questionable. Barring exceptional circumstances, such occasions are not too frequent with simple directives
to shut doors, but they can arise. When they do arise, Beth's directive may not be determinate as to whether Sam has fully complied.
Suppose that Sam walks over to a table, pours himself a glass of
water, drinks it, and then shuts the door. Did Beth mean Sam
should shut the door before doing anything else? The temporary
delay may or may not lead Beth to think that he has failed to comply fully, and Sam may or may not perceive himself as slightly insubordinate. Suppose that Sam shuts the door enough so that no
one can see inside and most noise is blocked, but the door does not
"click" shut. Has he successfully shut the door? For most of my
family life, that would have counted as shutting a door in our apartment; but we now have a dog who can push open doors that have
not clicked shut. If I ask a son to shut the door to my room partly
because I want to keep the dog out, my request has not been fulfilled completely unless the door clicks shut. With virtually any request or directive, doubt can exist as to whether certain responsive
behavior constitutes compliance or noncompliance, or constitutes
only partial compliance rather than full compliance.
3.

Exceptional Circumstances

Unusual circumstances may require Sam to act in a manner
different from that which obviously would comply with Beth's directive in ordinary circumstances. Suppose that as Sam puts his
hand on the door, he sees Beth collapse or notices the company
president approaching Beth's door. In either event, Sam should not
close the door.
Just how to state this conclusion is perplexing. We might say
that although Sam has not complied with the literal significance of
Beth's directive, the directive effectively lapsed 11 because its force
did not cover the unexpected circumstance. 12 We might say, alternatively, that the actual meaning of the directive incorporates certain assumptions about the underlying conditions for obedience,
including conditions up to the time of compliance. On this view,
11. Sometimes the lapse may be only temporary.
12. Another conceptual possibility is that the directive exercises some force, but
that the force is overridden by good reasons for noncompliance. This way of characterizing these situations is inapt, however, because Beth's request, addressed to normal
circumstances, seems to have no relevance for these evidently abnormal circumstances.
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the directive itself excludes the circumstances in which Sam finds
himself. Focusing on the directive's meaning, we might distinguish
full meaning from literal meaning; or we might take the view that
the idea of literal meaning is itself misguided, that there is nothing
other than meaning in context, and that the meaning of Beth's directive in context does not reach these circumstances.
These nuances in the philosophy of language are not crucial for
. my purposes, but it is worth pausing over them for a moment, if
only to indicate why I subsequently use the language I do to treat
them. In some sense, Beth's directive does not require Sam to close
the door if the president is approaching or Beth collapses. Sam has
not failed to comply with a directive that really applies to him at the
moment he acts. We should not say, however, that Sam has complied with the directive to shut the door. 13 The action he should
now perform is not called for by the directive, and that action
would be the same if Beth had never given the directive. So, Sam's
appropriate action is neither compliance nor noncompliance with
any directive to shut the door that applies to him at that moment.
One basic question is whether the present absence of an effective imperative to close the door is somehow part of the "meaning"
of Beth's directive. The idea that it is part of the meaning is most
persuasive if the situation has arisen previously. Suppose on some
prior occasion Sam has closed the door in the president's face and
Beth has responded, "Sam, you should never do that. I didn't want
you to close the door if he was approaching." When Beth asks Sam
to close the door on subsequent occasions, she and Sam may understand what she says as meaning ~•shut the door unless the president
is approaching." Under this view, the meaning of Beth's directive
does not require Sam to close the door if the president is approaching; therefore, his failure to close it cannot be construed as a failure
to comply.
If the meaning includes all of the implicit understandings that
Beth and Sam may share, must a distinction be drawn between full
meaning and literal meaning? It is difficult to think of the literal
meaning as encompassing understandings which an outsider listening to the conversation might not comprehend. One might scrap
the idea of literal meaning altogether in favor of meaning in context.
However, I am inclined to think that the idea of literal meaning
13. I suggest below that one way of looking at the directive is: "Shut the door,
unless . . . ." One of the conditions after "unless" arises. In a sense doing nothing
might be seen as "complying with the directive including its unless clause." But this is a
weak sense of "complying" because it boils down to "not violating."
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makes sense and that litera} meaning includes some basic assumptions about the conditions in which an utterance is made, 14 but does
not include all the understandings that the speaker and listener
share.
A different method of conceptualizing the· nonapplication of
Beth's directive is to say that the directive lapses, or lacks force in
the situation. On this view, the unexpected intervening circumstance renders the directive inapplicable. This approach is most
persuasive when neither Beth nor Sam has foreseen the circumstance. Suppose it has never occurred to them that between the
time Beth says, "Please shut the door," and Sam shuts it, Beth may
collapse, a devastating earthquake may occur, or Sam may discover
a fire in the building. It is a strain to pack all of these exceptions
into "unless clauses" that are part of the meaning of Beth's directive. It is also a strain (though a lesser one) to say that part of the
meaning of the directive is that the listener should exercise discretion not to do what is directed if unforeseen extraordinary events
occur. It makes more sense to say that the directive simply lacks
relevance or force because of what has happened.
Let me summarize my best understanding of this somewhat
tangled conceptual topic. When exceptions to an imperative are
part of an antecedent understanding between speaker and listener
that limits conditions of application, the exceptions are part of the
meaning of the imperative. On occasion they will be part of its literal meaning, but often they will be part of a meaning that extends
beyond the literal meaning. 15 When exceptions arise because of circumstances that were not anticipated, the exceptions are not part of
the meaning of the imperative. Rather, the force of the imperative
lapses because of intervening events.
I now return from this brief tangential attempt to characterize
the conclusion that Sam does not need to shut the door. Ultimately
what matters is not the characterization but the conclusion: Sam's
failure to shut the door if Beth collapses or the president approaches
is appropriate, and carrying out the simple terms of Beth's directive
would be inappropriate. In declining to shut the door, Sam has not
"failed to comply" in the sense of not complying with an imperative
that is presently requiring him to shut the door. If he actually shuts
14. See generally J. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING 117-36 (1979).
15. Sometimes full meaning not only reaches beyond literal meaning but also contradicts it. This can occur when the speaker and listener have a reason to conceal the
actual meaning from others, as when the Nazis phrased their directives to kill Jews as
instructions to "treat" them.
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the door in these circumstances he is likely to be castigated for extreme stupidity.
Does the problem of unusual intervening circumstances undercut the previous conclusion that when imperatives are spoken, some
actions objectively represent failures to comply? If some circumstances render the simple content of an imperative inapplicable,
how can we say with confidence that in any other circumstances
Sam objectively is required to shut the door?
We can examine this question in light of a suggestion that
Frederick Schauer made: unless the language of rules is taken in a
highly literal sense, their "ruleness" is undermined. 16 Schauer says
that when rules are interpreted in terms of their purposes they fail
to function as rules, but rather become reminders or "rules of
thumb" about the advantages of behaving in a certain way. At least
as far as an individual imperative is concerned, this dichotomy is a
false one.
Sam supposes that Beth wants the door closed to prevent interruption or overhearing, and more generally to serve the firm's welfare. The ensuing conversation ·between Beth and Sam will not then
be possible if Beth collapses or the president wants to see Beth.
Other obvious purposes, Beth's health or retaining the good will of
the president, may be disserved if Sam shuts the door. If purpose is
put at the abstract level of the company's welfare, shutting the door
will disserve the very purpose that led Beth to ask Sam to shut the
door. Beth does not want or expect Sam to shut the door if she
collapses or the president is about to walk in. (If she had wanted
that, she might have said something like "Shut the door, and do so
no matter what is happening to me or right outside of the door.")
Sam and others in similar situations are expected to act with sensitivity to the reasons underlying the directives and not carry them
out when unexpected events raise exceptionally strong countervailing reasons.
Under ordinary circumstances, however, Sam's duty as a
subordinate is clear. Sam appropriately may raise a question before
he acts, such as "Do you really want the door shut, considering how
hot the room will get?" But if Sam says nothing or Beth repeats her
original directive in response to his inquiry, Sam has lost whatever
power and responsibility he might otherwise have had to decide
whether the advantages of circulating air, openness to fellow employees, and so on, outweigh the reasons for shutting the door.
16. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 534-38 (1988).
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That decision 'definitely has become Beth's, not his. Furthermore,
even if Sam thinks Beth's own interests would be marginally better
served by leaving the door open, such considerations do not provide
a basis for his not closing the door as long as they are within Beth's
apprehension at the time she issued the directive. The directive
constrains Sam's behavior to a great degree and, as far as his responsibility as a subordinate is concemed, 17 virtually dictates his
course of action except in genuinely exceptional circumstances.
The reader's experience will attest that in an extremely high percentage of situations in which someone is directed or requested to
shut the door, no genuinely exceptional circumstance intervenes.
Thus, interpretation in light of purpose need not tum an imperative
into a rule of thumb. Many, many standard circumstances will remain in which a determinate, objective answer will exist as to
whether behavior complies with an imperative like Beth's.
4.

Exceptional Circumstances and Instances in Which
Compliance Is in Doubt

If exceptional circumstances call upon Sam not to carry out ·
the terms of Beth's directive, he must be left with some latitude in
identifying which unanticipated circumstances are exceptional
enough to prevent him from carrying out the directive. Not all circumstances will be clearly ordinary ones in which the directive applies and continues in effect or clearly exceptional ones in which the
force of the directive lapses. Somewhat unusual circumstances may
arise when the application of the directive and the manner in which
Sam should respond to it are unclear. Suppose that when Sam gets
to the door, he notices another subordinate, Sandra, approaching
Beth's door with an evident wish to talk to her. Especially if he is
relatively new on the job, Sam may not be sure whether Beth wants
him to shut the door, indicating to Sandra that she should wait, or
keep the door open until Beth can hear briefly what has brought
Sandra to her office. Sam may not have the time to ask Beth what
she wants him to do before Sandra reaches the door and, in any
event, he may suppose that Beth would be embarrassed to say that
she wants the door shut to keep Sandra out even if that is her wish.
In short, Sam, and a reasonable person in his situation, may be unsure what effect Sandra's approach has on the directive, and he may
17. Here I put aside the possibility that the reasons for keeping the door open are
so substantial that Sam thinks seriously about overriding Beth's directive. In the sense
that such action always remains an option, Sam retains the final decision over whether
he should act. That problem is discussed below.
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have reason to act one way or another without seeking a clarification. If Sam closes the door and Beth questions hiin, he might say,
"I did what you asked and I assumed your directive covered this
circumstance." If Sam does not close the door and Beth questions
him, he might say, "I thought you probably wouldn't have wanted
me to exclude Sandra," or "I didn't think your request really covered this situation." In this circumstance, there might be no objective answer as to whether Sam should shut the door; the effect of
Beth's directive may be indeterminate. The significance of the directive in these circumstances may depend in part on how much
Sam knows about Beth's management style and general wishes. If
the force of the directive is indeterminate, Sam's own personal sense
of appropriateness will influence his reaction. This range of indeterminacy of application does not detract from the conclusion that in
many circumstances Sam must shut the door if he is not to disobey
the directive and that in other circumstances his failure to shut the
door will definitely be appropriate.

5.

Whose Perspective Controls?

Circumstances in which the application of the directive seems
to be in doubt raise questions about the mamier through which the
meaning and effect of the directive are to be ascertained. In this
Article, I am taking as determinate only those answers which are
virtually universal. Although the speaker's and listener's perspectives will rarely, if ever, diverge in these situations, I find it analytically clarifying to focus briefly on such divergence. To examine
what criteria determine meaning and effect, we need to consider
"wants" versus more complicated feelings and the speaker's expectations versus the listener's perceptions. As a rough beginning, we
might suppose that Sam's standard of action is what Beth wants
and that the range and effect of her directive are determined by
what she wants. But that would certainly be an oversimplification.
Imagine that Beth prefers open doors but has been told by her own
boss that she must ask subordinates to close doors, or that she dislikes Sam and would be delighted to have a clear instance of insubordination so that she could fire him. Beth might actually hope that
Sam will not comply, but she has nonetheless directed him to shut
the door. Insofar as Beth's subjective state is relevant, it must be
her sense of what Sam will understand her to mean.
An approach to meaning and effect that focuses on the speaker
must take into account the speaker's expectations of the listener,
but is the speaker's perspective finally conclusive of the directive's
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significance, .or· does the listener's perspective have more relevance
than th~t? Suppose Beth has actually misspoken and wants her
window, not her door, shut. The listener's perspective would seem
to control. We would not say Beth has instructed Sam to shut the
window if she has said, "Please shut the door," 18 even if she is consciously thinking "window" all the time. Perhaps the significance
of the directive should be taken to be Sam's reasonable construction
of it.
If the directive's significance is unclear in context, as when
Sandra approaches Beth's door, and the speaker's and listener's perspectives diverge, which perspective, if either, should be taken as
finally determinative? This question itself is probably misconceived.
One needs to be more precise and ask "determinative for what purpose?" If Sam is deciding. what to do and asks a fellow employee
for advice, the fellow employee will probably be guided by his own
best guess of Beth's understanding of her directive's coverage.
That, of course, depends on more general ideas about how people in
firms should relate to each other. Some people may think that if
bosses have not spoken very clearly, sub.ordinates should act as they
think best. I assume that for matters of this sort, most persons understand the objective to be to conform to the boss's sense of her
directive. Thus, the friend would advise based on his perceptlon of
the speaker•~ intent. However, suppose the issue is not what Sam
should do but whether what he has done warrants criticism. If he
acts as a reasonable listener in his situation would, he does not deserve criticism. For that purpose, the reasonable listener's perspective should be determinative. 19 Insofar as a listener's perspective
about a directive does control in arguable instances, that perspective
might focus completely on the listener's reasonable perceptions of
18. On the distinction between speaker's meaning and sentence meaning, see Hurd,

supra note 5, at 962-67, discussing various ways in which the kind of divergence indicated in the text might be handled under the highly influential approach of H.P. Grice,
which emphasizes speaker's meaning, that is, what the speaker expects the hearer to
understand the speaker as intending him to understand. In some instances in which the
speaker does not expect to be understood, the speaker's meaning would appear to depend on how the speaker thinks it is most likely he will be understood if he is understood at all. If I try . to give directions to someone who knows only a few words of
English, I may think the greatest probability is that my words will not be understood at
all, and I may think that the chance that the hearer will misconstrue them is greater
than the chance that he will understand them correctly.• Still, I usually choose words
that I think will be more likely to be understood as I want than in any other single way.
19. Sam, of course, does not warrant criticism if he has departed from the reasonable listener's perspective on the basis of an accurate insight about Beth's actual sense of
her directive.
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the speaker's expectation, including the speaker's·likely resoluti<;>n
of doubtful instances the speaker has not considered, or the listener's perspective might leave the listener some "discretion" to decide which doubtful instances fall outside the range of application of
the directive.
Only when we know the purpose of the inquiry are we in a
position to evaluate what perspective controls the significance of an
imperative. That significance depends largely on social practices
and expectations. Social practices not only help fill in the-content of
communications beyond the literal meaning of individual words,
they also help determine the perspective from which meaning
should be examined.
This truncated discussion of perspectives has powerful implications for the scope of imperatives, and legal norms in particular.
Without exploring those implications here, I shall make three important points. If the "determinate" applications of an imperative
extend beyond virtually universal applications and include applications that are "correct" by some more refined standard, then the
range of determinate applications will depend on the test of significance for the imperative. Insofar as an imperative's significance
rests on the actual speaker's perspective, for· example, the determinacy of applications will tum on what is in, or somehow would be
in, the speaker's mind. If no perspective takes evident priority, we
may have to say that a particular imperative is determinate from
one perspective but not from another, and later debate which perspective or perspectives should count. 20
Second, in some contexts it is critical to know how much the
language in which the speaker has framed an imperative limits the
listener. To use a phrase employed by legal scholars, "Is the language canonical?" The answer to that question is often intertwined
with the perspective one takes toward the significance of an
imperative.
·
The third point is that all of these complexiti~s do not threaten
the major conclusions I have drawn thus far. Usually speakers' and
listeners' perspectives coalesce across wide range. Most circumstances call for compliance; some render "compliance" evidently inappropriate; some would leave reasonable people uncertain or in

a

20. It is possible that once the purpose of the inquiry is specified, there will be
disagreement about the controlling perspective because of some evaluative difference.
Someone might think that any~me who guesses wrong about a boss's actual intent
should be punished. Under that view, Beth's intent should govern Sam's possible
punishment.
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disagreement about whether compliance is called for. 21 I am counting as determinate only applications upon which virtually all reasonable people would agree. These would be applications that
virtually all listeners would recognize as covered or not covered by
the speaker's words and purposes. In the example of Sam's shutting
the door, then, Sam objectively is required to shut the door immediately if no other person approaches Beth's office right after Beth
gives the directive and nothing extraordinary happens. This application of the imperative is determinate.

B. Responsibilities as a Subordinate and What Is Good Overall
A distinction exists between Sam's responsibilities as a
subordinate and his overall responsibilities, but his responsibilities
as a subordinate, and therefore the force of a superior's imperative,
usually have substantial normative force for what he should do
overall. My discussion of these two points concentrates on the clear
case of ordinary circumstances in which Beth's directive plainly requires Sam to shut the door.
For a variety of reasons, Sam might not believe Beth's directive
is conclusive about what he should do overall as a human being.
Suppose the company is planning to dispose of toxic wastes in a way
·that might endanger the community's soil. Sam has warned a few
friends, but they do not believe him. A community leader is lurking
in the hallway, and if Sam leaves the door open a crack, she may
hear Beth's development of the company's plans and be able to forestall their implementation. Sam is aware that if Beth knew these
circumstances, it would only intensify her wish to have the door
closed. 22 If Sam leaves the door open, he breaches traditional notions of employee responsibility, but his broader responsibility as a
member of the community may call for that action.
21. Conceivably, all people might be certain but disagree, or all people might be
uncertain. But, for examples like these, uncertainty of some will usually mix with disagreement among others. Much will depend on the temperaments of the reasonable people involved; some people are usually sure one way or the other; other: people are often
uncertain.
22. Analysis would be more complicated if Sam correctly supposes Beth would
wish him not to close the door if keeping it open might help forestall company plans.
One might say that this would then be an exceptional circumstance for which the directive's force would lapse. But as an employee, responsible to her own superiors, Beth
might still have told Sam to shut the door and justified her doing so. Possibly she hopes
as a whole human being that Sam will disobey a directive that remains in force for
company welfare only.
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This illustration raises a more general question about Sam's
view of the authority of Beth's imperatives. He may accept a broad
understanding about employee responsibility, but believe that exceptional circumstances like these call for violation. Or he may be a
social radical who thinks the policy-making of private companies
should be open to public view, and that subordinates should have as
much to say as bosses about whether office doors should be open.
Sam may think that "requests" by superiors should be only requests, not directives, and that junior employees should feel free not
to fulfill requests if they have opposing judgments or preferences.
Why should Sam, or an outsider who views Sam's situation,
suppose that Beth's directive carries authority? One answer may be
that hierarchy is necessary or beneficial, that power to decide most
matters is correctly located in superiors, that primacy in decision
contributes to an efficient economy, and so forth. From such a perspective, one reason Beth's directive carries authority is that it
should. But is there a response that does not tackle this question?
Can one just refer to prevailing assumptions about business people
and members of society, saying that people recognize the authority
of superiors and that one's duties as an employee are circumscribed
by this cultural understanding? Doing what employees generally
are supposed to do is part of what it means to play the "game" of
being an employee.
Sam might answer: "I did not choose to play this 'game.' I
have to work to make money, and these destructive as~umptions
about subordinates' duties warrant resistance." Sam's.. response
raises a practical and a conceptual problem. The practical question
is what Sam, and others, actually should do when subject to directives. Saying that Sam has a duty as an employee, in the conventional sense of employee duty, is not to answer the question of what
he should do overall. Violation of employee duties might, on occasion, do more good than harm or might foster proper relations
among human beings. Moreover, violation might help alter the understanding of appropriate duties. Some years ago, running personal errands for bosses, predominantly male, was often assumed to
be part of the job of secretaries, almost all female. Some secretaries'
refusals to perform personal errands testified to the intensity of their
feelings that the practice demeaned the secretaries; the refusals may
have helped shift the performance of personal errands from an ac-
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cepted conventional duty to something outside of the range of secretarial duties. 23
In favor of Sam's performing his employee responsibilities, one
might claim that conventional understandings define expectations,
and thus the parties have effectively agreed to these understandings.
Subordinates' duties are sometimes the subject of explicit agreement. More commonly, an employer assumes that someone who
takes a job implicitly undertakes to perform the duties that accompany the job, or at least those duties perceived by the prospective
employee when he accepts employment. By accepting the job, Sam
may have promised implicitly to act as employees are generally expected to act. If promises and similar undertakings have moral
force, those conventional understandings which were not forsworn
explicitly by Sam when he took the job bear on what he has agreed
to do and, therefore, on what he should, overall, do. 24 It does matter, of course, whether Sam chose his job in conditions of freedom
or could be said to have been coerced to accept particular conventional notions of duty because no employment opportunities without them were available. But if Sam has taken his job with adequate
freedom, Beth's directive exerts some nonnative force for what he
should do overall. Not only will it ordinarily be prudent for Sam to
do what Beth says, serious moral reasons exist for doing so.
I have so far assumed that we properly talk of conventional
duties that are attached to positions even if the conventional duties
may not coincide with what the positional duties should be or with
what it is right to do overall on particular occasions. That is, I have
assumed that we can say, "Sam violated his duty as an employee,"
without offering a judgment either that what he did was, overall,
wrong or that his duty was one that employees should have in a
good society. A radical might challenge this conceptual assumption. Pointing out that our concepts affect our actions, he might
claim that talking about the duties and responsibilities of employees
as something different from the duties and responsibilities of human
beings gives the actions expected of employees a higher status than
they should have. The radical might say that we should reserve the
language of duty and responsibility for actions that, overall, one can
23. Initial violations of conventional employee duties may not always be required
to change conceptions of duties-one can imagine political activity or union-management agreements, or even a general reconceptualization of what is appropriate in light
of novel notions of equality, doing so-but violations often make a contribution in that
direction.
24. They also bear on whether his dismissal would be justified or fair.
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commend to performance. If the radical based his claim on present
conceptual practice, an investigation of actual conceptual practice
would be needed to see if people do talk about their duties and responsibilities as employees even when they are unsure whether these
should be performed. I believe present practice does not support
the radical's challenge.
He might concede that his proposal deviates from present usage, saying, "This conceptual practice of isolating employee responsibilities is itself destructive because it generates uncritical
acceptance of undesirable directives. All of those persons who recognize that destructiveness should now use concepts in the way they
would be used in a good society. Therefore, we should refuse to
speak of employee duties except as a subcategory of actions that
people should,. overall, perform." 25 One powerful answer to this
proposal is that the present conceptual practice of distinguishing
employee duties and responsibilities from overall duties and responsibilities is actually preferable to the alternative and would remain
so in a good society. That practice allows us to talk most clearly
about what are generally conceived to be employee duties and
whether they are warranted. A second answer is that even if conceptual practices might be different in a good society, evaluating
substantive challenges to the existing social order is made too difficult when the use of concepts departs drastically from commonly
shared understandings. 26
As I indicate in more detail below, one's view. of who has authority will sometimes bear on the apparent scope of a directive and
on the range of applications that appear determinate, but my major
point here is that a challenge to the authority of Beth's imperative is
ordinarily separable from the question whether its scope and force
determine for many circumstances what Sam should do if he aims
to comply. Sam may understand perfectly well what act Beth demands and he may understand perfectly well that no condition has
arisen that would cause her directive to lapse, yet he may think he
should not perform the act.
25. This account closely parallels a possible natural law argument that one should
not speak of legal duties when complying with human law requires the violation of
moral duties.
26. As I have shown, a complicated chain of argument can challenge the idea of
normative force when the duties have less than ideal content, and can even challenge the
idea of conceptualization in terms of "duty" in such circumstances. Were the latter
challenge to be examined seriously, many more complexities with respect to the conceptual boundaries of employee duties would need to be explored.
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Collective'Imperatives
It may seem that thus far I have made relatively little progress

toward the conclusion that rules can have determinate applications,
but that assessment would be wrong. The succeeding steps can be
filled in fairly quickly.
I begin with a collective imperative. Suppose that upon Sam's
entrance to Beth's office, she asks two of her co-equals in the firm
whether they would prefer the door opened or closed, and each says
"closed." Beth then says to Sam, "We'd like the door closed,
please." This sentence, which amounts to a directive to Sam to
close the door, 27 represents a "collective intent."
.A collective intent can be based on acquiescence rather than a
positive affirmation by some members of the group. Suppose that
Beth's initial remarks at the meeting take a slightly different course.
She says, "Unless someone disagrees, I'll take it that we want the
door closed." . When neither colleague responds, she says to Sam,
"We'd like the door closed, please." Her comment to Sam again
indicates a kind of collective intent. The silence of the two colleagues does not show that either really wants the door shut or even
wants Beth to tell Sam to shut the door. Each may have had a
slight preference for an open door but, thinking that the other preferred a closed door, wished not to waste time, or each may have
wished to avoid starting the meeting by disagreeing with Beth.
When Beth alone told Sam to close the door, we know she wanted
to issue the directive if not necessarily to produce the directed result
of a closed door. When an intent is collective, and perhaps more
frequently when it is based on silent acquiescence, one may not be
confident that each of the participants wants either the result or the
issuance of the directive. Thus, contribution to a collective intent
supporting a directive
can be consistent with someone's having (1)
a
an initial preference for an outcome contrary to that which her contribution supports, (2) a hope that the directive will not be issued,
and (3) a hope that if it is issued, it will be disregarded. Of course,
that scenario is atypical. Those who support directives usually
want them to be issued and followed.
What are the conditions for a collective intent in these circumstances? It is not enough that Beth's associates know that their
27. In strict form, "we would like" may state a fact about feelings rather than
direct action, but such a statement, even without a "please," operates indirectly as an
imperative in our culture. The "please" at the end of the sentence may turn the "would
like" into explicitly imperative language. See J. SEARLE, supra note 14, at 30-49.
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joint silence may be construed as supporting a directive to have the
door shut. Suppose Beth had said, "I shall take your views today
about whether to shut the door as finally dispositive on whether to
shut the door for all future meetings among us three." Her companions might suppose that this use of their present inclinations for
future action would be unwarranted. When on a subsequent occasion Beth says, "We'd like to have the door shut, please," her directive may not reflect the acquiescence of the two others, yet they may
not bother to argue about it. What is sufficient to make Beth's directive an appropriate indication of a collective intent is that her
two associates both understand how their silence will be construed
and agree that it should be construed in this way. When Beth directs Sam to shut the door, she then has their genuine acquiescence.
Beth's associates will feel that if Sam does not comply with the directive, he has acted contrary to their authority as well as to Beth's.
What constitutes a collective intent depends partly on what actions are taken by people as underlying a collective intent. When it
is unclear whether one's actions contribute to a collective intent, the
presence of such an intent will be debatable. What amounts to a
collective intent is importantly conventional, but that does not
mean that the content of a collective intent can amount to anything
those who are later construing it agree upon. They must stick fairly
closely to reasonable understandings of what those whose actions
underlie the formation of a collective intent thought they were doing, or at least they must stick fairly closely when the reason for
divining collective intent is essentially to give effect in some sense to
the wills of those involved in creating it. 28

D.

The Determinacy of Rules

The shift from single directives to rules that are addressed to
many people and cover many situations does not alter my conclusions about the determinacy of certain applications of imperatives.
28. Judges, unlike Sam vis-a-vis his superiors, may have a more complicated task,
and a more creative role vis-a-vis legislatures. If the judicial role is properly highly
creative, it is doubtful whether it makes good sense to say judges are ascertaining "collective intent." If it does, "collective intent" in law may depart from any traditional
sense of collective intent. If the term "collective intent" in law is to maintain close
contact with "collective intent" in other spheres, delineating collective intent in law is
not exclusively a matter of political philosophy. That is, one would need to think not
only about optimal political arrangements between bodies issuing directives and those
later interpreting them; one would also need to consider what collective intent signifies
across a broad range of human activity.
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If single ancf collective imperatives can determine appropriate responses, so too can rules issued in advance.
Suppose that Sam receives the following notice issued by the
board of directors of the company:
.
The keeping of doors open has been shown to waste a great deal
of energy used to heat or cool offices. Except when someone is
· entering or leaving, all officers of the company should keep their
doors closed.

This rule differs from the collective imperative in that it is not issued at the precise time that a particular behavior is desired. Also,
Sam may be less confident about the underlying mental states and,
specifically, whose mental states the rule represents. It is now unclear whether Sam should be guided by judgments about any director's actual mental state. Perhaps he should take the directive as if
a single person issued it. 29 In any event, Sam still knows the board
of directors has authority; he further knows that the board• communicates in this way. At least if the rule has been issued recently,
he knows he should keep his door closed in the ordinary circum. stances that the rule plainly contemplates: when Sam is in his office
working on his own or meeting with someone else, his office door
should be shut. As with Beth's individual instruction, instances of
doubt may exist. May Sa,m open his door if the air conditioning is
not working? May he do so if a cli~nt of the firm says, "I'd feel
more comfortable if the door were open?" Obtaining immediate
clarification with respect to borderline cases is not possible as· it
often is with individual directive~; therefore, Sam and others like
him will need to use their own judgments more frequently.
When directives take the form of rules generally applicable to
people and situations, time elapses between their issuance and the
performance of acts under them; this time lag affects. how reliably
the rules are construed. But time is a matter of degree. Seconds
elapse betwe~n Beth's directive and Sam's shutting of the door; her
words two seconds ago may no longer represent her wishes now. If
Sam receives the general directive to keep doors. shut, he can be
almost certainJ that it applies two days •later or two weeks later. As
long as office. structures and heating and cooling remain the same,
the behavior ·the directive covers remains unchanged, and thus the
directive remains clear.
As time proceeds, it may be more difficult to say how much
force the directive has and to what extent it remains firm policy.
29. This is Ronald Dworkin's recommendation about how judges should conceive
legislation. See R.. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 313-54.
·
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Some rules seem to lapse in force as time passes; others do not.
When I started as a student at Columbia Law School in 1960, signs
prohibited parking on the western side of Riverside Drive on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. The
signs, or ones like them, remain. Traffic conditions and street cleaning practices remain similar. What the signs are taken to require
has not altered thirty years later. Three decades have not affected
the ability of virtually all drivers to comprehend what the signs require. Obviously, the force of rules can survive shifts in persons
occupying the positions under which they were originally issued. If
the unders~ding in Sam's firm is that firm rules survive changes in
the presidency, the requirement that office doors be shut will remain
in effect the day after the resignation of the president who approved
the requirement.
However, one must recognize two major difficulties with rules
and their·effects, the significance of which can increase with the passage of time. First, people sometimes issue rules, and even individual directives, that are formulated in more extreme terms than they
actually hope to achieve. Maybe the company's true aim is to have
doors shut most of the time; maybe Sam's leaving his door open for
~ve minutes while he gets a cup of coffee is not the type of behavior
that company officials seek to curtail. .Furthermore, Sam might
guess this from past experience and act accordingly. Has Sam then
failed to comply? ·
Does everything depend on nuanced apprehensions within the
company? As far as how Sam should act as an employee, perhaps
everything does depend on a subtle appreciation of the aims of the
directors. If a parent says, "You must study all afternoon," and
both parent and child know from past occas~ons that a few half
hour br~ks to watch television are permissible, then taking a few
breaks is not contrary to the parent's urging. But when Sam leaves
his door open in accordance with the directors' aims, has hejustifiably failed to comply or has he not failed at all? Certainly he has not
complied with the directive's literal meaning. If Sam had just
joined the company, he probably would assume fhat he should close
the door. One cannot pack into the literal meaning of the rule
everything that Sam is aware of as a seasoned employee. In deciding if Sam has failed to comply, it might matter what the company
officials would say if Sam's behavior were noted. They might say
either, "That's not really a violation" or "That is a violation but not
one that concerns us." In the latter event, they might have intentionally included broader language in their directive to simplify
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identification of violations. 30 Only more knowledge about the context for interpreting directives within the firm would allow us to
label Sam's behavior as within the real norm that the directive represents or as an acceptable deviation from the directive.
The second major difficulty with rules is that some never quite
get off the ground. Here is my recollection of a faculty discussion
and vote some years ago, and what followed. The faculty had expressed serious concern that what individuals had said in faculty
meetings about prospective appointees occasionally had gotten back
to the appointees. All agreed that this was a serious breach of
faculty confidentiality, but some faculty members also were concerned about reporting of evaluations to candidates and to members
of other faculties that did not identify the names of individual Columbia faculty making the evaluations. Despite mention by some
faculty members that an absolute bar on reporting such evaluations
in vague terms would be difficult to square with our requests during
our own appointment process that other faculties share their evaluations with us, we adopted an absolute bar on giving such information, and that resolution was moderated only by considerable
comment that the matter should be reevaluated after more careful
review. If a member of the appointments committee said to a dean
of another school, "Well, many people here thought X had very
interesting ideas but was not rigorous in developing them," the
member would have violated the stated faculty policy.
The matter never came back to the faculty. As far as I could
tell the resolution had little deterrent effect on reporting of general
attitudes, and when I inquired some months later of a key member
of the faculty, he said that he did not recollect any resolution nearly
as sweeping as the one I remembered. Believing that the resolution
was foolishly overbroad to begin with, and having other things on
my mind, I did not check the minutes to determine if my recollection was accurate. This subject was definitely within the faculty's
authority at our law school, and our faculty members are conscien30. Of course, identification of violations would matter only if some possible consequences, such as criticism or disciplinary action, depended on commitment of a violation. The officials might have taken this attitude: "We're really concerned only about
people who leave their doors open for long periods, but when we think we identify such
people, we don't want to get into squabbles over whether they were only leaving doors
open for short breaks." Sam's action here does differ from his justified failures to close
the door in my earlier hypotheticals. His closing of the door when he takes coffee
breaks would not defeat the purposes behind the closed door rule or any likely countervailing purpose. His leaving the door open briefly may be appropriate; his closing the
door certainly would be appropriate as well.
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tious about compliance with rules and policie~ voted by the faculty,
but somehow on this occasion, as I recall it, what was required ~as
too far at odds with ordinary and previously accepted practices to
make much of a dent. Very quickly after the vote, the newly stated
faculty policy ceased to be an operating restraint in the life of the
school.
The passage of time accentuates these difficulties about rules
and their effect. The understanding of what words. are meant to
prescribe may shift over time. Even if the high officials of the firm
originally wanted doors shut for short breaks, a more relaxed attitude may evolve, without any change in the governing directive.
The rule remains in effect, but the sense of its content shifts slowly.
And what is to be said of directives that have ceased to constrain
those subject to them, are forgotten by those who voted on them,
and are never brought to the attention of those joining the firm? If
my recollection is correct about what happened years ago, is the
rule against generalized reporting still "in force" for our faculty? It
was properly adopted and was never formally altered, but it is a
dead letter in the life of the school.
We need to conceive of an evolution of meaning and effect that
includes the understanding of those now responsible for administering and complying with rules. That significance may change in a
way not indicated by literal language was sharply illustrated by an
amusing example involving the strike zone in American baseball.
Through the season of 1987, the rule book provided that a pitch
over the plate and between the batter's armpits and knees was a
strike. 31 According to a baseball official, umpires over the years
had shrunk the strike zone and (perhaps with some exaggeration) in
"recent seasons, pitchers hadn't been able to get strikes on pitches
above the waist." 32 In the summer of 1987 a con~ientious major
league umpire properly could call a pitch just below the armpits a
ball, even though the supposedly authoritative rule book literally
specified otherwise. 33
31. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1987, at D25, col. S.
32. Id. In December, 1987, the rules committee changed the upper limit to" 'the
midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants,' " which
was said to be "the middle of a player's chest." Id. The explanation for the reduction in
the rule book strike zone was to expand the effective strike zone by providing a strike
zone that umpires would enforce.
33. Packed into this conclusion are judgments that consistency among umpires and
fulfillment of player expectations matter more in a game like baseball than do adherence
to the original rule makers, and a belief that virtually all of those associated with the
game of baseball would agree with the first judgment.
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Uncertainties about changes in meaning and effect, themselves
the results of social changes of various kinds, make it harder to say
as time passes when rules yield determinate answers to questions
about what people should do. However, frequently as to what were
originally conceived as standard circumstances, general directives
are still understood, and applied if there is a stage of application, in
essentially the same way as they were when first issued. For these
we can comfortably say that determinate answers have not altered
much over time.
II.

RULES AS PARTS OF SYSTEMS OF RULES GOVERNING
COMPETITIVE GAMES

I now tum to an example of a rule that controls activities in a
game. This setting reinforces the major theoretical points just made
and shows how the import of a rule may be plain although the
words of its formulation are unclear as applied to a specific situation. Informal basketball games are often played "half-court" with
one basket. 34 In some games, when a member of the defensive team
rebounds a missed shot, that team must "take the ball back" before
its shot will count. The rule covering how far back one must go is
often phrased, "as far back as the foul line."
An intense school yard game involves players all of whom
have played many times before. In prior instances all baskets
made without going back to the foul line were disallowed. On
two occasions a teammate of Kate's rebounds a shot by the other
team and passes the ball to Kate. The first time Kate is half a
step in from the foul line; the second time Kate is in the corner.
On each occasion her shot at the basket goes in, and an opponent
says, "No basket." Both times Kate responds, "My shot
counts."

Are Kate's claims objectively wrong? I think they are. The
first instance is easiest. Shots taken in front of the foul line always
have been disallowed. All players have understood the rule to require one to go back to the foul line, not just close to it. Kate might
argue that she went back far enough to serve the purpose of the
rule, but games would be plagued if highly contextual decisions had
to be made about how far is far enough. In any event, all of the
players have accepted an interpretation of the rule that is literal in
this respect.
·
34. I am sympathetic with feminist disquiet over unnecessary uses of sports analogies in talk about law, but organized sports are among the few activities in our society
that are governed by highly specific and detailed rules, and their place in my own experience gives me more assurance in analyzing them than do possible alternatives.
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When she shoots from the comer, Kate might claim her actions conformed to the literal meaning of the rule. The comer is
further from the basket than the foul line, so she has taken the ball
back "as far as the foul line." The language "as far as the foul line"
might be so interpreted, but the decisive answer to Kate's argument
is that all of the other players have understood the rule differently,
to require that one cross an imaginary line extended froni the foul
line to the sidelines and parallel to the endline. Thus, "as far back
as the foul line" is to be understood in this way. A somewhat different way of stating the same conclusion is that the phrase "as far
back as the foul line" is not to be taken as a definitive formulation of
the content of the rule. The rules of half-court basketball may be
largely arbitrary, but they are what participants accept as the rules.
Kate's "interpretation" is contrary to "the rules," as they must be
understood in any plausible account of what rules are for in informal competitive games. By contesting a clear shared understanding
among all relevant participants (including herself up to the time she
proposes a change), Kate tries to play in a way that is "not according to the rules."
Kate might respond that rules, even the rules for informal
games, need a capacity to grow. One method of growth is disagreement over, and resolution of, borderline instances. But Kate cannot
rely on that argument. Kate urges a sharp change in the existing
rule. Our culture shares a basic understanding that sharp changes
in rules of informal competitive games are not made after the fact
when urged by a team that would benefit. They are agreed upon
before the game, or during the game to cover plays that have not yet
taken place. Even when the possibility of instant retroactive change
in the rules is considered, Kate's assertions that her shots should
count as baskets are objectively wrong. The rules yield a determinate-negative-answer to her claims.
Now comes the question of authority. Why should the import
of the rules constrain Kate? Is she free to play by different rules or
to act upon different methods of changing rules? Suppose she has
bet on the game and that her team wins if her shot from the comer
counts but loses otherwise: is she free morally to refuse to pay the
bet? 35
The answer here is easy. Kate has played before. She knew
the rules and roughly the manner in which they might be changed.
35. I assume here that betting is not intrinsically immoral, and that either it is legal
or that, if it is illegal in some sense, a loser still has a moral duty to pay off.
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By agreeing to play in the game, she implicitly agreed to accept the
rules that governed it. Bound by her implicit agreement, she should
pay the bet.
My basic conclusions hold if we introduce a referee named
Ralph:
Ralph has played often with members of both teams. The
players have agreed Ralph's decision will be final on all questions, and Kate's claims to have her shots count are directed to
Ralph.

If Ralph counts either shot, his decision will be objectively wrong
under the relevant rules. Ralph implicitly has agreed to referee according to the rules, including both the import of existing rules and
the manner in which changes may be made. Ralph lacks authority
under the rules to count her shots, and his implied promise binds
him to reject Kate's claims. 36
A legal system and its norms are, of course, much less simple
than office practices and half-court basketball games, but these examples have allowed me to illustrate significant theoretical principles. The import of individual imperatives and rules may be
determinate as applied to standard instances. That proposition may
be true even when the linguistic formulation alone could be read
differently. Understandings shared by many within specific contexts often provide the basis for comprehending the import of rules;
they constrain the methods by which the rules may be changed;
they usually give rules normative force, thus providing a reason for
compliance.

Ill.
A.

THE FREQUENCY OF EASY QUESTIONS AND
DETERMINATE ANSWERS

Introduction

I tum now to examine the common belief that given existing
legal institutions and standards, many legal problems have definite,
objective answers, the answers provided by the law as it exists. For
this belief to be sound, law need not be firmly rooted in morality,
36. For most games, imagining an actual immoral rule is hard, but assume that
Kate is a voluntary gladiator, and at some stage of a contest the understood rules call on
her to kill an opponent. Realizing the barbarity of this practice, she hits her opponent
with a symbolic blow evidencing her ability to kill and then claims that the contest is
over. If Kate can get Ralph to go along with her interpretation, both will have acted in
a praiseworthy way. Within the norms of the gladiatorial enterprise in which they are
involved, she and Ralph will have "failed to do their duties," but from a broader perspective, they will have performed morally preferable acts.
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economics, or culture, but legal standards must yield answers. The
most ambitious claim of determinacy is that the law provides an
answer to every legal question, but that claim has few modem defenders, 37 and I am not one of them. I defend here a modest claim
about determinacy: many legal questions have determinate answers
that 1) would be arrived at by virtually all those with an understanding of the legal system and 2) are unopposed by powerful arguments, consonant with the premises of the system, for contrary
results. One might think, especially in light of my nonlegal illustrations, that this claim has all the bite and profundity of a truism, but
occasional passages in skeptical writings appear to cast doubt upon
it. Joseph Singer has written, for example, "[L]egal reasoning is
indeterminate and contradictory. By its own criteria, legal reasoning cannot resolve questions in an 'objective' manner .... " 38 David
Kairys has said that "legal reasoning does not provide concrete, real
answers to particular legal or social problems. Legal reasoning is
not a method or process that lends reasonable, competent, and fairminded people to particular results in particular cases. "39
Few,· if any, writers have asserted the most extreme thesis
about indeterminacy-that no legal questions have determinate answers-in clear terms, and almost no one may actually believe that
thesis, but establishing why that thesis is absurd is helpful. Then
one can address more clearly problems about whether particular
37. Ronald Dworkin has been the most vigorous and best known defender of that
claim. His fullest and most recent systematic treatment is in R. DWORKIN, supra note

s.

38. Singer, supra note 4, at 6.
39. Kairys, supra note 4, at 244 (footnote omitted). Allan C. Hutchinson, in his
introduction to readings he has edited, CllmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 7 (A. Hutchinson ed.
1989), has written that CLS has salvaged the powerful insights of realists "and insists
that no objectively correct results exist, regardless of whether presented in terms of legal
doctrine or policy analysis and no matter how skilled the judge or advocate." An article
of his published the same year indicates that critics do not claim that all cases could be
decided either way, that indeed most cases are easy but this is because of extra-doctrinal
considerations of acceptability. Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 557, 560, 567.
Mark Kelman has said: "The Realists seem to me to be fixated on the indeterminacy oflanguage, on the difficulties any rule maker would have in restraining the discretion of those who apply her rules simply by abstract verbal directive." M. KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 12 (1987). Noting that this position is "rehearsed
by most CLS adherents," he believes that a stronger CLS claim is that the legal system
is simultaneously philosophically committed to mirror image contradictory norms. Id.
at 13; see also id. at 45-16. Charles A. Yablon has urged that central to the CLS position on indeterminacy are statements about legal explanation, neither descriptive nor
normative statements about the law itself. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 917, 937
(1985).
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questions have"determinate answers (and in what sense), the frequency of indeterminism iq. the legal system, and the implications of
that indeterminacy for the legitimacy of courts and other legal
authorities.
· In this Part, I emphasize that the law often has determinate
answers to possible legal questions. Most often the answer to
whether liability of a particular kind •arises from an action is "no."
I discuss briefly the frequency of determinate answers relative to
indeterminacy. In the following Part, I discuss the possibility of
determinate answers in the context of a simple statuiory formulation, analyzing the argument that even an apparently plain application of the statute may not be determinate. I consider specific
arguments bearing on the legal problem and also three general contentions that might be thought to undermine a claim of determinate
answers. It might be urged that unreliable fact finding makes determinate answers impossible, that legal rules guide rather than determine action, or that deep uncertainties about the role of courts
render all results indeterminate. I show why a sensible thesis about
determinacy is not threatened by any of these contentions. I then
address the problem of how shared understandings for the law are
to be ascertained, a much more complicated matter than the analogous procedur~ for an informal game. This subject introduces some
problems about determinacy that arise because of the different
levels of ~uthority within a legal system. I also briefly indicate the
distinction between what the law requires and what it is best, overall, to do. I urge that at least for officials acting in an official cap~city; legal requirements carry normative force that is broader than
simple legal duty:
A legal question concerns the legal consequences of actual
events or supposed events. A legal question is rarely about law in
general, but rather is about a specific aspect of the law of some jurisdiction. If a law school professor tells a student she will raise his
grade, bu~ only if he buys her season tickets to the symphony, we
might ask whether the professor has acted tortiously or violated
some statute providing civil recovery, whether she has breached her
employment contract; and whether she has committed a crime. We
would concentrate mainly on state law but might also look at federal statutes. For criminal liability, we would raise separate questions about different offenses because penalty structures vary and,
even when identical penalties are available, it may matter whether
someone is guilty of one or many offenses. One answer to a legal
question, of course, is that behavior does not violate a legal norm.
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Practicing lawyers spend a lot of time figuring out what actions are
legally permitted.
It is important here to draw a critical distinction that can be
obscured by the phrase "a legal question." The legal questions that
are mainly of interest to people concern the legal consequences of
their actions or the legal status of claims made on their behalf during the legal process, not the precise formulation used to assess legal
consequences. Any narrow legal rule or broader principle. may be
stated in many different ways. Once a judge or lawyer departs from
actual constitutional or statutory language, the best way to formulate a legal standard is open to debate. There will be no precise,
single formulation that virtually all lawyers will agree is superior to
every other possible formulation. If agreement about formulation
were taken as the basic criterion for a determinate answer, there
would be no determinate answer to the phrasing of a legal standard.
With rare exceptions,40 different formulations will have somewhat
different implications for the treatment of certain situations but
many activities will be excluded or included under all plausible formulations. For instance, no plausible formulation of the statutory
crime of theft, under present social conditions, will include the ordinary act of scratching one's nqse. Every plausibie formulation includes the intentional taking of someone else's valuaple painting for
one's own permanent use. My claim about determinacy is not
about the precise formulation of legal standards;41 it is about the
legal consequences attached to acts and claims. ·

B. Invariable Indeterminacy?
Once the question about determinacy is u"oderstood in this
way, we can see how ridiculous is the suggestion that no or few legal
questions have determinate answers. Legal questions are about sub40. "No person under eighteen years old may vote" may amount to exactly the
same rule, with the same practical implications, as "only persons who are eighteen years
old or over may vote." Even if, for some reason that I fail to see, these two formulations
are not an exception to the idea that different formulations have different implications,
other slighter differences may qualify: "Persons over eighteen may vote" or "People
over eighteen may vote." On the broader problem whether different linguistic forms
can carry identical meaning, see E.D. HIRSCH, THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 50-63
(1976). Even if different linguistic forms cannot carry precisely identical meanings, they
could indicate the same practical consequences. ·
41. I use the term "standards" as a general term to cover.both fairly precise rules
and broader formulations that require contextual decisions by adjudicators. This usage
differs from the division between rules and standards in Duncan Kennedy's important
article, Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1685 (1976).
.
,
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divisions of law in particular jurisdictions. Pushing someone during
an argument is not larceny, or a taxable transaction, or acceptance
under the law of contract. If a citizen of Poland pushes another
citizen in Warsaw, that is not a crime in Vermont. The criminal law
of every jurisdiction is determinate in its nonapplication to most
distant events,42 and some modem criminal codes begin with a
statement of jurisdictional limitations. Moreover, life is filled with
acts, like scratching one's nose and putting one's socks on, that patently do not give rise to legal liability. 43 The norms of any legal
system are determinate in their nonapplicability to countless human
activities.
Is a thesis of invariable indeterminacy plausible if the universe
is restricted to questions that actually arise for someone about the
application of legal norms? The answer is "no." Given wide misunderstanding about basic features oflaw, some questions that actually occur to people are bound to have determinate answers. As
they were growing up, my children often supposed that annoying
behavior of others that was at most a civil wrong must be a crime
that could be punished. The percentage of determinate answers
may decline as we move from all instances in which an individual
thinks about possible liability, to instances in which thoughts lead
to discussion, to instances in which an expert (or a published
guide)44 is consulted, but given wide ignorance about specific legal
rules, even in the last category some answers to legal questions will
be indisputable.
A thesis of invariable indeterminacy may seem more plausible
if it is limited to legal cases. Skeptics have focused mainly on cases,
as illustrated by the use of that word in the second sentence of the
quote from David Kairys in section A above. Thought about such a
42. Matters are somewhat more complicated with respect to civil law. The pushing
in Warsaw is not immediately a tort in Vermont, but if the two Polish citizens then
move to Vermont, one might be able to recover against the other given the conflicts of
law rules in Vermont. Characterization of the situation if Vermont courts use the tort
doctrines of either Vermont or Poland is not easy.
43. See Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing· Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 462, 470-73 (1987).
Further, the law might make people liable for pure thoughts, and it might make
animals or even plants liable for events. The question whether I am liable for a fleeting
thought or a dog is liable for barking have determinate negative answers.
44. Many people have simple income tax questions answered by the instructions
accompanying their forms.
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thesis requires us to consider what constitutes a ·case45 and what
specifically might always be considered indeterminate. What are
"cases"? Every instance in which someone makes a claim, including, for example, a letter from one party to a contract to another
party asserting that the contract has been breached; every instance
of a formal claim, including disputes settled before a court actually
does anything; every instance involving some judicial determination, for exampl~, admissible evidence; every dispute decided by a
trial court; every case addressed by an appellate court? If we are
interested in the determinacy of law, limiting inquiry to cases actually decided by courts would be highly arbitrary, but it would be a
helpful beginning if we could assure ourselves that court decisions
in cases are never determinate.
We need first to distinguish overall disposition of a case from
determination of each legal question in the case. The answers to
some legal questions in a case might be determined by the law even
if indeterminacy in other aspects renders the result indeterminate. 46
Plainly some legal questions that arise in some cases have determinate answers.
David is a defendant charged with armed robbery. Prosecution
witnesses say he was the robber. His defense is an alibi; his witnesses say he was one hundred miles away when the crime was
committed. No other evidence besides eyewitness testimony connects David to the crime. David's lawyer asks the judge for an
instruction which makes it clear to the jury that if it believes his
witnesses, it must return a verdict of "not guilty." 47

In giving this instruction, the judge "answers" a legal question in
the only way that would occur to anyone; she determines that one is
not guilty of robbery if he did not commit the robbery and had no
connection with the robber but happens to bear a physical resemblance to him.
45. For an extensive analysis of the elements that constitute· a "case," see Felstiner,
Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . .. , 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980-81).
46. The reverse is also a possibility. It might be clear that certain grounds would
assure a result in favor of one side; the answers to other questions the court addresses
might be indeterminate.
47. As Lawrence Crocker pointed out to me, the instruction that a defense lawyer
would actually request would tie the jury's evaluation of the alibi witnesses to the reasonable doubt standard that the prosecution must overcome in criminal cases. I have
avoided that complication because there may be doubt in some jurisdictions about the
appropriate phrasing of the reasonable doubt standard as it applies to alibi witnesses. I
focus instead on the stark situation in which the jury thinks that the witnesses probably
are telling the truth.
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Is it possible that if some legal questions in cases have determinate answers, no cases that reach courts have such answers? If a
case as a whole did have a determinate answer, why would a lawyer
contest it? With respect to the first question, a suggestion that no
case has a determinate answer founders on the fact that cases sometimes do not involve significant disputes over legal questions, only
over the facts. The trial of the robbery defendant who claims he
was elsewhere might be such an instance. In Part V, I discuss factual uncertainties as they bear on claims of indeterminacy. Here it
is enough to mention that in some cases which turn on the facts,
there may be no doubt about how the relevant law applies. With
reference to the second question, lawyers sometimes have reasons,
such as publicity or delay, to pursue legal claims they know are
extremely flimsy.
The significance of consensus on the appellate level is harder to
assess. The percentage of agreement on routine cases among appellate judges is remarkable. While he was sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals, Benjamin Cardozo estimated that nine-tenths of
the cases before that court, New York's highest, could come out
only one way. 48 Studies have suggested·that in cases brought before
the federal courts of appeals, dissents are filed in only four percent
of the cases. 49 It appears that a high percentage of cases that lawyers think are worth pursuing, judges find to be "easy." Does it
follow that the answers in such cases are determinate?
Were the test of a determinate answer an answer that would be
recognized as correct by a substantial majority of those familiar
with the law, then substantial judicial agreement poses a serious
problem for a proponent of indeterminacy. But my standard in this
Article is stricter; the answer must be one that virtually all lawyers
familiar with the issues would recognize as correct. 50 If the standard involves what virtually all lawyers think, a lawyer's taking of
48. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924). Walter Oberer has suggested that when a case belongs in court, legal doctrines do not decide it. Oberer, On
Law, Lawgiving, and Law Professing: The Golden Sand, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 203 (1989).
49. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200, 204 (1984). Some federal appellate judges
do not always dissent, even when they would decide the other way were the decision left
to them. But voting with the majority while disagreeing on outcome apparently occurs
fairly rarely, and mainly in unimportant cases. Usually agreement in vote does mark
agreement about the right result.
so. In How CoURTS GOVERN AMERICA 4 (1981), Richard Neely, Chief Justice of
the West Virginia Supreme Court, wrote, "My test for whether there is a clear legal
principle is whether if ten lawyers were put in a room, given a legal principle and a set
of facts as to which that principle could be applied in order to reach legal resolution of a
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the case to an appellate level may be more significant than the
judge's agreement in rejecting his argument. Lawyers sometimes
pursue issues they think they will and should lose, and lawyers litigating for clients may lose sight of how substantial their arguments
are, but lawyers who appeal often believe they have a fair chance of
winning and should win. The taking of an appeal is often some
indication that a lawyer thinks that the result below was mistaken. 51
I emphasize here that a lawyer's prediction of a likely result is
not necessarily the lawyer's reasonable judgment about what a result should be. Some writers have suggested that if a decision is
highly predictable, then the relevant law is determinate in the sense
that matters. 52 Proponents of extensive indeterminacy, however,
are making a claim about the imperative significance of legal materials and institutions, not about predictable outcomes. 53 And that is
what I address. If judges of all different political persuasions agree,
that may be significant evidence of strength of competing positions
about the legal materials, but conceivably judges, because of com7
mon background and high position, might agree on answers not required by the legal materials. Judicial answers might be highly
predictable but not determinate in the sense.that counts here. 54 It is
to meet the objection that wide agreement by itself, even among
lawyers and judges, does not establish the determinacy of an answer
that I have added the second of my criteria: that no powerful argument for a contrary result be consonant with the premises of the
legal system. Thus, if a powerful contrary argument can be
mounted, I concede that an answer is not determinate in my strict
sense, even if virtually all lawyers agree upon the answer.
A slightly different possible claim of indeterminacy than any
discussed so far is that any legal issue requiring "interpretation" or
dispute, nine out of ten would arrive at the same answer. I leave room for a tenth
because in such a group one lawyer will inevitably be either stupid or eccentric."
51. This proposition would not be true for criminal cases in which pursuit of the
appeal is a routine obligation of representing a defendant. More generally, decisions
about appeal based on economic calculation would lead to appeals when the cost of
appeal is slight compared with the value of victory, even if the chances of victory are
modest (assuming settlement after trial is not possible at a figure that would warrant
relinquishing the chance to appeal).
52. See Solum, supra note 43, at 483. See generally Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77
CALIF. L. REv. 283, 324-28 (1989), for a thoughtful discussion of the significance of
predictability.
53. See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 4, at 247-48; Singer, supra note 4, at 22-24.
54. Some answers are highly predictable even when the court is divided. On some
questions, as to which a minority of one or two Supreme Court Justices disagrees with
tlte majority, one knows with great confidence that they will not carry the day in the
near future.
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"legal reasoning" is indeterminate. Everything here would depend
on what constitutes "interpretation" or "legal reasoning." If any
construal and application of legal language counts, the claim is
false, for reasons developed in this Article. If interpretation by definition'' involves something more than a straightforward application
of norms, then all or almost all 56 of the issues that require interpretation or reasoning may be just those issues for which the law as it
stands provides no determinate answer in the narrow sense I employ here. 57
A thesis that the law is always indeterminate is hard to understand; in any comprehensible and significant formulation, it is incorrect. The subsequent discussion deals with some other possible
defenses of the thesis, but they do not alter my conclusion. An important question may be how often the law is indeterminate.
C.

Pervasive Indeterminacy?

A claim of pervasive indeterminacy hypothesizes that the law
is much more often indeterminate than traditional legal scholars believe. Accompanying this claim may be an assertion that pervasive
indeterminacy undermines the legitimacy of existing law and the
courts.ss·
Even if we begin with my strict criteria for determinate answers, we have no simple or single way to calculate the extent to
which the law is determinate. One might put the issue in terms of
some range of logically possible legal questions. The percentage of
determinacy would be very high because of the wide range of acts
and events that do not carry particular legal consequences. For example, the fact that a Yugoslav's scratching her arm in Belgrade
SS. See Hancher, What Kind of Speech Act Is Interpretation, 10 POETICS 263, 269
(1981). The passages cited in supra text accompanying notes 38 & 39 might be read as
concerning only cases in which some complicated reasoning is required.
56. I do not think the fit of issues that do not require "interpretation" with those
issues that have determinate answers would be complete because some problems are so
complicated that interpretation may be required, but once the problems are understood,
only one answer seems appropriate. See Massachusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
57. Similar to this claim of indeterminacy would be a claim that cases the Supreme
Court disposes ofby full opinions are indeterminate. The Supreme Court does not often
take cases and write full opinions when all reasonable lawyers agree on answers; it
spends most of its time only on the relatively difficult cases.
58. See Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 543. According to Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 781, 819 (1983), "the limits of craft are so broad that in any interesting case any
reasonably skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she wants." (emphasis
added).
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does not constitute murder in New York should not count as a determinate answer. °To be useful, an estimation should encompass
only acts that are, or plausibly might be, within the domain of particular legal standards. The issue should address the frequency with
which legal materials give definite answers to questions about coverage of law that actually might arise.
In this inquiry, focusing only on issues or cases that reach the
courts would be a grave mistake. Studying only opinions, especially
appellate opinions, leads to a highly distorted view of the determinacy of law. The percentage of questions that have easily determinate answers is greater than the percentage of questions that the
courts discuss that have such answers, because many straightforward questions and answers never reach litigation. Suppose (to
pick an absurdly high figure) that ninety-nine percent of all legal
questions with which people concern themselves have readily ascertainable determinate answers, but that only five percent of questions
that are seriously litigated do. Focusing on the courts would give a
misleading picture of the law's determinacy overall, and therefore,
perhaps, a misleading picture of whether the legal system as a whole
enjoys some kind of legitimacy.
Could someone respond that figures like these might indicate
legitimacy for aspects of the system, but not for decisions by courts,
since the answers courts give are so often not required by the law?
A common defense of the legitimacy of courts in light of substantial
indeterminacy for the questions that occupy them is that their relative detachment from power politics, their deliberative techniques,
and their methods of justification make them better suited than
other organs of government to resolve the legal questions that lack
determinate answers. But there is another powerful defense less frequently made that views the role of courts more br9lldly. A court
system may be necessary to stand ready to declare on the questions
that do have determinate answers. The threat of court enforcement
by· one party may induce the other party to accept what the law
provides. When questions without determinate answers are intertwined with questions that have determinate answers, resolution by
one body may be needed. It may not be feasible for courts to identify questions without determinate answers and tum them over to
mini-legislatures or executive officers. Thus, the appropriateness of
courts deciding questions without determinate answers must be
viewed not only in light of their comparative ability to deal with
these questions, but also in light of the way these questions fit in a
context of disputes that also raise questions with determinate an-
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swers. Once.this is'understood, even a conclusion that a rather high
percentage of questions that courts a,ctually consider lack determinate answers would not necessarily undermine either the legitimacy
of the law in general or the function of courts.

IV.

STATUTORY FORMULATIONS AND DETERMINATE
ANSWERS

I now turn from these general observations to a legal example
analogous to my nonlegal illustrations. Having just emphasized the
obvious nonapplication of legal standards tQ many acts and events, I
now concentrate on a rule that apparently does apply. I ask, in
light of my treatment of the nonlegal examples, what analytical
steps and social assumptions allow us to say that a legal standard
applies to yield a result? I consider a statutory rule. Since the standards of the common law are harder to formulate than statutory
rules, and critical constitutional clauses tend .to be open-~nded, the
way in which these might yield determinate answers on which virtually all reasonable lawyers agree is more complicated. That discussion is reserved for Part Vil ·
·
The claim th~t the law can· yield determinate answers is most
straightforward with respect to simple statutory texts.
The city council has recently adopted an ordinance that
says, "Persons walking dogs in public parks must have their dogs
leashed." · Violations ate punishable by a fine. The ordinance has
been enforced widely by police and judges. Observed by a police
officer, Olive, upon entering the park, lets her dog Max run free
without a leash.· Paul maihtains one end of a firm, five foot leash
in his han.d while the other end is attached to his dog's collar.
Quentin has a similar leash on his dog, but the leash breaks and
the dog runs free.

Which, if any, of the three dog owners has cohimitted a punishable offense? We need first ask if the specific statutory provision
has been "violated. "'9 That question is the primary focus of this
Part. 60 Paul's case is the easiest. Whatever vagueness or ambiguity
lies in the words of the ordinance, Paul has complied with it. Under
59. I use the quotation marks around violated because it could be argued that a
cancelled violation is not a real violation, that each criminal provision somehow carries
within it all valid claims of overriding justification. On this view, if Olive has a general
justification, she has not "violated" the leashing ordinance.
60. If the answer is "yes," we must then determine if the "violation" is cancelled by
an overriding norm. All other norms of our legal system are subject to principles of
constitutional law, and applications of specific provisions of criminal, law are subject to
claims of justification. In Part VII, I consider whether a constitutional right or the
general justification defense may override application of the leashing ordinance.

1990)

DETERMINATE LAW

39

the American system of law, courts are not free to create new
crimes:. Indeed, many states provide in their own. penal codes that
all crimes must be staiutory. 61 The law provides a determinate answer to the question of whether Paul has committed an offense by
walking his dog with a leash. He has not violated this ordinance,
and if no other relevant staiutory language exists, he has not committed an:y crime.
·
Quentin's case is the most difficult for a court.· There is aperiod of time during which Quentin does not "have [his dog]
leashed," but perhaps accidental unleashings should not be considered violations. Quentin's state of mind and the reasonableness of
his behavior might be relevant to his offense. We would need to
know more about Quentin and the law to decide if Quentin's case
has a clear answer, but here I simply ·want to assume that the law
may be indeterminate as applied 'io him. The application of language may be indeterminate in some instances and determinate in
others. 'Indeterminacy with respect to Quentin does not establish
general ·indeterminacy.
Olive's case requires more analysis than that of the other two.
It poses the question whether a legal rule can ever impose liability
that derives in a determinate or objective way from the rule. If Olive intentionally let Max run free for the entire time in the park,
Olive plainly appears to have violated the leashing provision. However, we can imagine at least two contentions Olive m:ay have about
why she has not committed a violation. One argument is that the
words of the ordinance are unclear and that she complied with their
literal significance. A more promising argument is that the import
of the language, construed purposively, does not apply.
The language of the ordinance says that persons' walking dogs
in public parks ,must "have their dogs leashed." 'olive might claim
that she has had Max leashed on other occasions, and· that the ordinance does not specify when the dog must be leashed. If we divorce
the language from this particular social context, this argumept is
not absurd. Suppose the ordinance had read, "Persons walking
dogs in public parks must have their dogs vaccinated." We would
not expect owners to be vaccinating their dogs as they walked with
them in the park. A prior vaccination would be sufficient. How can
we be sure leashing is different? The purpose of leashing is to prevent dogs from running free; prior leashing does not serve that pur~
pose. · The meaning, even the' literal meaning, of this language
. 61. See. e.g.',

CAL. PENAL CoDE

§ 6 (West 1988).
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depends on social understandings not only about what particular
words mean but also about the point of using the words in context.
The reason why we know that a prior leashing does not satisfy the
ordinance is the same as the reason why we know that Sam is not
supposed to cross over to Beth's desk and shut a cabinet door if
what Beth says is "Please shut the door." No reasonable person
could think that the leashing referred to is other than at the time the
dog is walked.
'
Olive might argue instead that she and Max simply do not pose
the danger the ordinance was meant to avoid, and that therefore the
ordinance should not be applied to her. 62 She might say, "The ordinance aims to assure control over dogs, so they don't bite people,
fight with other dogs, and make messes in the wrong places. Max is
well controlled and behaved, and therefore he should be considered
effectively 'leashed.' " This argument has broad significance, since
many dog owners can offer similar claims.
·
A full answer to this argument is not simple. Although the
words of the ordinance talk about leashing, not control, fictions are
part of our law, and saying that an effectively controlled dog counts
as being leashed would not be ridiculous. However, this sort of minor offense needs simple enforcement. Police can see if dogs are
unleashed; control is more subtle. Were Olive's argument to win,
probably only dog owners whose dogs cause serious trouble would
end up being treated as offenders. The city council could have chosen words referring to effective control, and it has acted recently.
The ordinance has been enforced actively and other courts dealing
with it have assumed a• literal interpretation of the word "leashed."
A judge who views all these factors in combination63 is bound to
62. Olive might also contend that while leaving Max unleashed did raise some of
the risks that the ordinance was meant to reduce, the reasons for her actions were so
strong that the ordinance should not apply. Were there not an applicable general justification defense, such contentions certainly should be considered in construing an ordinance, and they might be considered in that way even given the general defense. If, for
example, an ambulance enters the park to rescue a stricken person despite an ordinance
barring vehicles from the park, the ambulance does generate the harms and risks that
led to the ordinance, but the reasons for its entering are so powerful that a court might
properly conclude that the ordinance does not apply. Olive similarly might advance
claims that the purposes underlying the ordinance were overridden. To avoid duplication, I reserve discussion of these claims for Part VII, which deals with general
justification.
63. . I must confess that a change in circumstance and perspective has shaken me a
bit on this point. When I initially drafted this example, I ran in a park frequented by
unleashed dogs and was a member of a household that had firmly decided having a dog
was impractical. AB a consequence of my wife Sanja's death and my boys' pleas for a
dog, I am now in a household with a big friendly dog that needs lots of exercise, and
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conclude that Olive's argument fails in our legal system. The legislature recently established a literal rule, and courts here lack authority64 to substitute a much less literal approach. 65 The question
whether Olive has violated the provision itself has a determinate
most of my running is done with him. Most dogs in Riverside Park, including ours, are
unleashed most of the time. For that large park with comparatively few people at most
hours of the day, I now believe a nonliteral interpretation might be acceptable. I still
think it would not work for most New York parks, and I do not suppose judges sensibly
can impose diff'erent rules for diff'erent parks.
64. In this sentence and elsewhere in the text, I assume that a judge would not now
properly reject present, central ideas of legislative supremacy in some radical way. To
be more precise, if by the language it has chosen and by any other available indications
of its purpose, the legislature has disposed of a problem one way, and other relevant
officials assume that way to be the law, a judge should not reject that disposition in
favor of another he or she thinks is only somewhat better.
How does my assumption fit with Ronald Dworkin's interpretive approach of law
as integrity? See R. DWORKIN, supra note 5. This type of clear recent legislative mandate would certainly be part of the preinterpretive body of law according to Dworkin.
Under his view, the best interpretation of the law might alter something so that it is no
longer regarded as the law. Even central paradigms might be overturned. But a minor
issue such as this would certainly not be an occasion to overturn in one fell swoop basic
notions of legislative supremacy. And as Dworkin says, id. at 255, "Any plausible
working theory would disqualify an interpretation of our law that denied legislative
competence or supremacy outright .. ~ ."
My discussion here and elsewhere also assumes that legislation should be regarded
as a form of imperative. Challenging this position, Heidi Hurd, supra note 5, has argued that legislation fails to meet the requisites of communication between a speaker
and audience and should be considered not as an imperative but as "descriptive" comment (like a captain's entry in a ship's log) about "optimal legal arrangements." Under
this view, a legislature is a "theoretical" rather than a "practical" authority. Professor
Hurd's arguments are too complex for me to attempt to summarize and seriously respond to them here, but (1) I believe that the communicative difficulties are still best
handled by treating legislation as a kind of imperfect imperative communication; (2) I
do not perceive a feasible line between official directives that are communicative because
they meet the requisites (a written order is sent to all those subject to it) and those that
are not communicative; (3) in light of all the compromise and logrolling in legislatures,
viewing legislation as a description of optimal legal arrangements seems a large strain;
and (4) most importantly, the intricacies of communication theory in the philosophy of
language seem a bad starting point for suggesting that courts treat legislation diff'erently
from its prior treatment. To be fair, Hurd's argument, as I understand it, is that by
perceiving legislation to be noncommunicative, we are thereby freed to regard it in the
most appropriate light. But whether legislation is genuinely communicative or not
strikes me as not too important to whether legislation should be treated as directive or
descriptive in Hurd's sense. In any event, the crucial practical significance in Hurd's
approach for my purposes here would be how far judges could substitute their own view
of "optimal legal arrangements" for those indicated by the legislature. As long as the
legislature's view of "optimal legal arrangements" for matters of this type is regarded as
controlling (absent some serious immorality), Olive's case would remain an easy one. I
do not think Professor Hurd suggests anything to the contrary.
65. I put aside the possibility that the judge thinks a literal leashing ordinance is
grossly immoral or grossly misconceived. That might matter.
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answer: she did. It now remains to explore this conclusion in
greater depth.
V.

A.

SOURCES OF POSSIBLE DOUBT

Factual Uncertainties

Against my suggestion that the law provides a determinate answer to whether Olive violated the leashing ordinance, one might
argue that doubts about facts render all such applications indeterminate, that neither language nor legal rules can determine anyone's actions, or that, whatever the apparent clarity of legal
language, deep uncertainties about the role of courts undermine determinate applications. I begin with the first objection, that the law
is never determinate because relevant facts-about the immediate
case or deeper facts about the usage of language or social convention-are uncertain. (For the most part, I employ a simple approach to what "facts" are, but I explain why my conclusions are
not dependent on that.)
That the facts conceded by both parties in negotiation or determined in judicial proceedings sometimes vary from what actually
occurred is an obvious truth. In any case, the likelihood of the facts
being found correctly is less than 100%. If factual uncertainty were
the only basis for doubt about an appropriate result, we could speak
of the law as being determinate given the factual findings of a court
or given a different state of facts supposed to be true. Contrary to
the intimation that the only useful way to speak is about applications or predicted applications of rules to facts as they are found,
our ordinary discourse is rich enough to include more than one possibility. Suppose in a tennis match Steffi Graf hits an ·unretumable
ball to Monica Seles. The lineswoman, supported by the umpire,
calls the ball "out;" a television replay shows it was definitely "in."
Simone, returning from the kitchen, asks Rich, "Who won the
point?" Rich would have to be extremely simple-minded if all he
said was "Graf" or "Seles." He will say, "The instant replay
showed Graf hit a winner, but the officials called it out and awarded
the point to Seles." We talk comfortably both about outcomes according to officials' decisions and outcomes according to correct applications of rules to facts.
To vary the hypothetical a bit, suppose that the lineswoman
had fainted and missed the shot altogether. The umpire considers
what to do. Before she decides, Rich has witnessed the T.V. replay,
which is unavailable to the umpire, and Simone asks about Graf 's
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shot. Rich may say; "Yes, it was definitely good though very
close." Rich's comment here is not fundamentally a prediction of
what the umpire will decide; it is a statement of what the result
should be, given an application of the rules of tennis to the actual
facts.
- If doubt about how a legal rule would be applied rested exclusively on doubt about accurate determination of facts like these, we,
like Rich, could say: "There is a determinate answer to how the
legal rule applies to the facts as they occurred; there is a determinate answer to how the legal rule applies to the different facts a
court might find; the uncertainty about the result concerns whether
the facts as found will sufficiently coincide with the facts as they
actually occurred." 66
Occasionally critics resist the claim that the law is determinate
with respect to an assumed set of facts in the following way: "It is
possible that some yet unrevealed fact would alter the conclusion;
therefore, the result on these facts is not determinate." Take, for
example, an assertion that Nick's scratching of his nose is not murder. If Nick's scratching of his nose was a signal to someone else to
set off a bomb, the scratching could make him liable for murder. It
is true that for any state of facts of which we are aware, it is possible
that some other facts unknown to us could alter the legal consequences of actions. When we -say that the legal consequences of
certain facts are determinate, we mean the consequences are determinate, barring the existence of yet unrevealed facts of legal importance. The chance of newly revealed facts functions here like the
chance of misfound facts, as something that could alter the outcome. In many circumstances, confidence that no relevant facts remain to be discovered is great. As a percentage of nose scratchings,
the instances when someone's scratching his nose might amount to
murder are exceedingly few. To say that the law is determinate as
66. Within the law many terms that sound factual, such as "intentional" or "coerced," require a degree of judgment in their application. Two people who somehow
understood every relevant event that transpired, including all relevant mental events,
might disagree about whether a person acted "intentionally" or about whether the perso_n had been "coerced." In such constructions, traditionally called mixed questions of
law and fact, more is involved than ascertaining the bare facts.
Although the issue is the application of a factual sounding term, the real question,
decided by judge or jury, is how the legal rule, including this term, applies to a given set
of facts. What I have said here does not, of course, cover legal characterizations of
facts. For my purposes, these count as legal conclusions, not factual findings.
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applied to facts is to say that it is determinate in the absence. of
additional legally relevant facts that could alter the outcome. 67
That the legal system often fails to yield correct results because
the basic facts are not reliably discovered is a highly significant
truth, and the study of pitfalls that lie between events as they happen and a corresponding legal determination to that effect is important. That more fully developed facts can alter the legal conclusion
that seems appropriate is also significant. But a substantial thesis
about the indeterminacy of law must rest on more than such uncertainties of fact finding or gaps in fact statements.
What I have said about facts and legal determinacy does not
depend on what may be considered by some to be a naive and misconceived realism about "facts." Suppose that we give up the ordinary commonsensical view that events actually happen "out there"
(a leaf falls from a tree, a dog runs without a leash); that these
things happen regardless of whether anyone perceives them; and
that when a person asserts that they happened, he implicitly claims
that what he says happened corresponds with the actions that transpired, independent of any human perception. In its place we substitute the view that worrying about whether any world outside
human perception exists is not useful; that the only facts, or the
only facts to which human beings can .relate, are facts perceived by
·human beings. Since the events we witness are filtered through our
consciousness, and every person's consciousness differs to some extent from everyone else's, there is no factual truth that transcends
the consciousness of individual human beings; no "facts as they actually occurred." Our only test for truth is the coherence of an
asserted proposition with other propositions that we accept, and
further, the meaning of assertions of truth amounts to no more than
claims about coherence with other beliefs. 68
If we grant all of this, no nihilistic conclusion is warranted.
Substantial correlations in individual perceptions will still give
human beings a strong interpersonal truth. Presented with clear
conditions of observation and precision about what is to be ob67. This conclusion is meaningful only if y.,hat is legally relevant is ordinarily determinate. In some circumstances it is arguable whether something is legally relevant.
But there are not many types of facts that might be relevant to deciding whether
scratching one's nose is murder.
68. The previous sentences together encompass challenges to what may be called
metaphysical realism, epistemological realism, and realism of meaning. See Moore,
supra note 5, at 874-81. I am self-consciously considering a skeptical view of each
relevant issue. By my present understanding, I am a "realist" about metaphysics and
about the meaning of factual statements, but I accept a coherentist test of knowledge.
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served, virtually all people who pay attention will be able to say
whether a particular leaf falls or a particular dog runs without a
leash. Some legal cases will come down to facts that can be observed in this way. If the police officer says Max was running free
and Olive says he was on a leash, one or the other, in all likelihood,
is not accurately reporting his perceptions as they were at the time
of the event. We might reformulate my notion of the facts as "they
actually occurred" into a more complex idea of facts, perhaps as
"they were perceived by those present or would have been perceived
by virtually any sane adult in our culture69 who was present." 70
The reality that events only have meaning for human beings
through their own consciousness interjects a degree of subjectivity
or indeterminacy. But we still make many assertions about ordinary factual events with a very high degree of confidence, for instance: "Rain fell in New York yesterday," or "John F. Kennedy
was killed in 1963." If the indeterminacy or nonobjectivity of law
amounted to nothing more than the "nonobjectivity" of factual
claims like these, a claim of nonobjectivity would put discourse
about facts or law on the same basis as other factual discourse and
would have no disturbing practical implications.

B. Law as Guiding, Not Determining
Some writers prefer to speak of the law as guiding rather than
determining behavior. In one sense imperative language does not
determine anything; the person to whom the language is addressed
must decide whether to do what is demanded. 71 This element of
choice exists for a person responding to a legal rule as well as for
one responding to an informal individual directive. It exists for
69. A reference to an existing culture may be necessary because members of a
vastly different culture might have radically different perceptions.
70. Probably much more complex reformulations would be required if one were to
aim for a vocabulary that would be precise in rejecting the idea of facts as they actually
occurred. Past presence at events and past perceptions are themselves facts. One who is
skeptical about facts "as they occurred," must also be skeptical about "past presence"
and "perceptions as they occurred," so, to be precise, one might have to talk about what
people without noticeable defects in memory who are reporting honestly would now
recall as having been perceived by them (as most people now over forty recall having
perceived from television reportage in November, 1963 that John F. Kennedy was
killed).
71. See Yablon, supra note 39. If a full explanation of a legal conclusion must
include an explanation of why the judge actually chose to use the legal materials as he
or she did, I do not see how existing materials could conceivably provide a full
explanation;
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judges as weii 'as"'ordinary citizens. _In this respect, legal rules can
only guide, not determine, behavior.
.
. . ..
But the ability of an imperative to indicate a uniquely correct
or incorrect course of action for someone who is attempting to comply is another issue. In this sense, I have urged that both individual
imperatives and legal rules can yield determinate answers. Beth's
directive to Sam was not just a pointer about preferable actions; it
required Sam to close the door. 72 The leashing ordinance directed
Olive not to walk in the park with an unleashed dog. Combined
with other legal institutions and rules, it directs a judge to decide
that Olive's actions constitute· a violation. Sometimes legal standards may only guide officials toward one of a number of actions.
My contention is that the leashing ordinance does more than that
for a judge faced with Olive's action. It instructs the judge to count
her acts as a violation. It provides the judge with a determinate
answer, one that is objectively correct under the law.
C.

The Role of Courts

Uncertainties about the role of courts present a complex chal~
lenge to the thesis that law has many determinate answers. A legal
tule is more than imperative language. Saying that S~ was subject
to a company rule to keep his door closed implied something about
what a company is and what authority was within Sam's company.
Saying that a judge must decide in a certain way is to accept certain
ideas about the nature of a legal system. The half-court basketball
example showed·that practice may render application of a rule clear
even though its verbal formulation may not be clear. Similarly,
practice can make application unclear even though the language itself seems clear. The rule about leashing dogs might be construed
in a nonliteral way, as demanding only effective control. Why can it
not be argued that since courts might decide in favor of a nonliteral
application, 73 applicat~on of the rule is not determinate, even in the
c~e of Olive and Max?
1.

Simple Approaches to the Role of Courts

The relation of courts to legislatures and officials may be
viewed in various ways. I mention briefly three simple apprbaches.
The first focuses on legislative intent. Gerald Graft has suggested,
72. Some discretion is, of course, left to Sam, such as which hand to use in closing
the door. · ·
·
·
73. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 15-23, 338-54, for cases in which the argument for a "nonliteral" application is very strong.
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Any sophisticated theorist of language would point out that the
meaning of an utterance isn't a function of the words themselves
or even of the sentence, but of the use to which the words and· ·
sentences are put by speakers and writers . . . . Guessing the
meaning of a text or utterance is inferring what a writer or
speaker was or is doing with language and not what some linguis._
tic object essentially was or is. 74

Under this approach, a distinction between sentence meaning and
speaker meaning is unwarranted; all depends on the speaker's
meaning in context. 75 Were judges to follow a speaker's intent approach in applying statutory rules, their job when an intent was
clear would be to use it. It is often said that the language of statutes
is canonical, and that courts must take it as authori~tive, but under
this approach the language would become merely a highly reliable
guide to ·what the legislature intended. This approach is subject to
major objections, one of which is that the idea of a collective legislative intent is troublesome when most legislators have little or no
conception of a range of applications for most statutory provisions. 76 Another is that no one has yet suggested a persuasive way
to combine intents when disagreement exists.
A second approach would emphasize what a reasonable reader
would conclude about how a legislature would want the words of. a
statutory rule to be applied. Some avenues of ·inquiry available
under the first approach, such as statements by iegislators after a
law was adopted, and perhaps even comments during the legislative
process, might be barred. The second approach could be sustained
even if it were recognized that for most relevant subjects of lawmaking, 77 no subjective collective intent exists. It could be recognized
that any "intent" referred to is a legal construct, one that, for purposes of application, treats a collectively adopted rul!! more or less
as if it were issued by an individual who thought about the
provisions.
74. Graff, "Keep Off the Grass;" "Drop Dead" and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 407--08 (1982) (emphasis in original).
75. As I have noted, at least in the extreme case, in which Beth says, "Shut the
window," intending to say "door," the meaning of what she has said does seem to
diverge from her intent.
.
76. · On the difficulty in inaking sense of legislative intent, see MacCallum, Legislative Intent, in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 237-73 (R. Summers ed. 1968).
77. A collective mental intent might exist about what a rule is meant not to do.
Legislators voting on a bill entitled "A Leashing Ordinance" do not think they are
adopting a death penalty for terrorists who hijack airplanes. One could assert that the
legislators intended that the rule not adopt such a penalty even though that possibility
will never have occurred to them.

48

UCLA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 38:1

A third approach asks what it now makes sense to enforce,
given the legislation's language and history and the acts and expectations of citizens and other relevant officials. I suggested in Part I
that a major league umpire in the summer of 1987 rightly called a
pitch just below the level of the armpits a ball although according to
the language of the rule and the intent of those who wrote it the
pitch should have been called a strike. Under this third approach
eventual adoption of a nonliteral application of the leashing rule
might be appropriate. What a court should do under this approach
in any particular case would rest on a complicated theory of its role
in respect to legislatures, enforcement officials, citizens, and other
courts. Does that mean application is inevitably indeterminate?
The answer is "no," because the conventions of legal practice limit
what positions are at all reasonable, and the result under every reasonable position may be the same. At least when the same answer
to a legal question plainly would be reached under all plausible accounts of a court's role, the answer is determinate.
2.

Reasonable Understandings of a Court's Role

Who is to say, and by which criteria, what are reasonable understandings of a. court's role? A more detailed examination is
needed to see whether the complexities of law undermine a claim
that all reasonable observers will agree on some applications of
rules. Matters were fairly simple for the rules of informal games;
the understandings of voluntary participants controlled. Participation under legal rules may not be voluntary, and how much the
understanding of various groups count is much more difficult to
assess.
a.

The Relevance of Voluntary Participation

Those subject to legal orders often have not agreed to the authority of officers of law for that occasion, and, despite traditional
social contract theory, most citizens have not voluntarily agreed in
general to accept the legal system and obey its orders. 78 Sometimes
voluntary acceptance of specific substantive law and official power
will be present.
Joan and Keith enter into a. contract. Familiar with contract law, they agree that they want the contract law of Illinois to
govern terms that are not specified. They appoint an arbitrator
to decide all of the disputes arising under the contract. An issue
arises. A decision favorable to Keith is the one clearly indicated
78. See K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY (1987).
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by the literal language of the relevant statutory provisions of Illinois, given the presently shared understandings of the meanings
of the relevant words and phrases; it is the result assumed by
those who have entered into contracts in Illinois and thought
about the issue; it is the result reached by all courts and arbitrators applying Illinois law; it is the result that was envisioned by
Joan and Keith, and, as they initially informed the arbitrator,
one reason they chose Illinois law was that were either party to
be found in Keith's present situation, that party was to win.

If Joan has the bad sense and grace to urge a contrary interpretation, the arbitrator is bound by everyone's shared understanding to
decide in Keith's favor.
What if someone has never agreed to the intervention of the
legal system for some matter, say his possible punishment for taking
a neighbor's valuable vase? The absence of voluntary participation
by all those directly affected is not crucial for what counts as the
law. If the great majority of those involved in some enterprise are
satisfied with relevant rules and understand a rule in a certain way,
if those who adopted the rules understand the rule in this way, and
if all of those who apply the rules understand it in this way, then we
can say that interpretation within the norms of the enterprise yields
that result, even if the person who loses by an interpretation would
rather not be part of the enterprise at all, or would prefer to have a
special exemption on this occasion. 79

b.

Shared Understandings

How do different groups count for determining relevant understandings about particular rules and about criteria for interpretation? Within a legal system one group of people adopts laws;
another is subject to them; still other groups enforce and apply
them. And since legal rules exist over a period of time, the group of
people who adopted a law is different from the group that now has
the power to repeal or alter it. 80 As I have already mentioned,
much of the debate over proper techniques of statutory interpretation may be viewed as disagreement over the importance of the understandings of different groups. My main point here is that when
the groups are in ascertainable agreement about the meaning of a
79. Matters may be different if the majority of the affected population rejects sets of
the rules altogether (such as the rules establishing apartheid in the Republic of South
Africa) and therefore would like to see the rules interpreted as ineffectively as possible.
Perhaps matters are also different if the particular accepted interpretation offends some
higher normative principle drawn from the legal materials themselves or directly from
standards of political morality.
80. Of course, a single individual may be in two or more of these various groups.
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rule, a judge, who has voluntarily assumed his or her position, is
ordinarily constrained by these shared understandings.
When we consider disagreements in understandings of the particular language of a rule, or about the role of courts, we face genuinely troublesome questions about law's determinacy. One kind of
disagreement is within relevant groups; another is between relevant
groups. The first is subject to relatively easy analysis. In my basketball example, I assumed .unanimity of understanding about the
meaning of the relevant rule. Were .understanding completeiy divided, with half of the players thinking the rule meant one thing
and half that it meant the opposite, no relevant shared understanding would exist. If, instead, there is only slight dissent from the
prevailing understanding-one person out of a hundred takes a
view different from the other ninety-nine-we can still speak of a
shared understanding. Something less than unanimity is required.
Once this is granted, we must recognize that no sharp line will indicate when a shared unde~tanding is broad enough so that the rule,
in context, read in light of conventional understandings, determines
the result.
The dilemma is more serious when disagreement is mainly between groups, for instance, most legislators suppose one thing (or
the most plausible account of what the legislature has done would
indicate one thing) but most judges and participants suppose
other. Application of a rule may not be determinate then unless
some clear hierarchy of sources. is supposed. As far as judges are
concerned, some clear hierarchies do exist in the common law system. Lower courts are bound to apply rules in a manner established
in precedents by the highest court that decides such questions.
Thus, if the Illinois Supreme Court has decided a case that is not
plausibly distinguishable from the dispute between Joan and Keith,
and nothing has occurred in the meantime that alters the relevant
statute or suggests that that court is likely to change its mind, a
lower court in Illinois, ~d an arbitrator, would have the law determined as far as it was concerned. Since the Illinois Supreme Court
is free ~o overturn its own precedents, we can imagine a case, one
when the arguments for overruling are substantial, in which the
statutory rule as presently understood might determine an outcome
for a lower court but not for the state supreme court. 81

an-

81. I assume that no one thinks the supreme court will change its mind, despite the
presence of good arguments for doing so. When lower courts think higher courts will
overrule, it is arguable whether they should stick to the precedents they expect to be
overruled.
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D. Levels of Authority and Discretionary Noninvocation'of Legal
Rules
The last point about the hierarchy of courts suggests a more
general and subtle problem. The actions of various individuals and
official organs affect the application of law. Perhaps what is determinate for one person applying the law will not be determinate for
another. So long as one crucial official does not have his action
determined by the law, can we say that the law is determinate in
application to behavior? If police sensibly regard themselves as able
to "overlook" some violations of the leashing ordinance that resemble Olive's, does the law, or the legal system, really give a determinate answer about whether her behavior is wrong under the law? A
proponent of indeterminacy might claim that some official or person will always have latitude not to apply the law and thus its application is never objectively required. 82
Initially we need to untangle threads of this question. What
are persons who may apply the law normatively constraiI_ied to do?
How will they act? How are we to conceptualize· the conclusions?
The more difficult problems of the criminal process can best be addressed after we consider a simple breach of civil law obligations.
Suppose that Joan clearly has breached a contract with Keith,
and the damages are $200,000. The instance is one in which the law
of contract plus the language of the contract itself would yield a
determinate answer for a judge. In our system of law, the damaged
party must initiate an action before officials are involved. It is not
assumed that damaged parties must, or should, bring actions; that
choice is left to them. The law, then, does not determine whether
Keith should sue; it also does not determine what amount the parties should settle for if Keith initiates a suit but does not pursue it to
a court decision. As far as substantive resolution of the dispute is
concerned, the law mainly determines what judges, or jurors,
should do about the case if it is tried. Since Keith is free not to sue,
we might say that the law overall does not determine that Joan
should be held liable because it does not determine that the case
should ever reach a court. It does not overall determine how she
should be treated because Keith is free not to invoke the remedies
that the law provides. One can argue about how to conceptualize
this conclusion, but the most comfortable way is to say that Joan
violated Keith's legal rights and is liable under the law, but that ·a
82. Mark Kelman, supra note 39, at 46-51, emphasizes such uncertainties in application. See also K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975),
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finding of liability and the invocation of legal consequences depend
on Keith's initiative. In any event, were this all that a thesis of
indeterminacy amounted to in civil cases, it would not be very
striking.
Matters become more complex when the institutions of the law
themselves make it unwieldy to establish one's theoretical rights.
Suppose Joan's "clear breach" relates to a transaction worth a few
dollars over which no sensible person would sue. As a matter of
prediction of likely consequences, we can now say that the law is
highly unlikely to be used to determine liability, although Keith is
permitted to sue if he is upset enough. 83 A judge or juror still is
required to decide in favor of Keith if he sues, a choice that the law
gives him, but the institutions of the law are set up in a way that
makes that course of action unwise.
When we tum to the criminal process, we know that a common discrepancy exists between the law on the books and the law as
it is brought to bear in relatively trivial matters. In some cities in
which an ordinance forbids pedestrians from jaywalking, police act
on "violations" with extreme rarity. If one is virtually certain no
enforcement official will act, does the law really prohibit jaywalking? Comparative triviality typically results in nonapplication of
norms that would seem ~•on the books" to apply and that would be
applied if a case went to court.
The reverse situation can also occur when norms broader than
those "on the books" are applied in practice. I recently found a
possible example in New York law. A close acquaintance's son,
fighting with a schoolmate in a secluded part of a public park, was
arrested for disorderly conduct. The lowest level of disorderly conduct is only a violation, less than the lowest category of misdemeanor. It can be committed by fighting when one has an "intent
to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
creates a risk thereof;" 84 recklessness in New York requires awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
The boys, accompanied by a few friends, chose the spot for the fight
as one out of the way, and they neither saw other people nor expected to be bothered. The boys lacked the required mental element to violate the law. Further, a decision by the highest state
83. Shortly after finishing law school, I was so angry that I got charged a two
dollar parking fee for a car I had left to be repaired (on the mistaken assurance by an
employee that the garage would do that repair), I sued for the fee in a court of small
claims.
84. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 240.20 (McKinney 1989) (disorderly conduct).
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court, involving a dance hall fight with seventy-five to one hundred
onlookers and accompanied by shouts of "fight, fight" that led
others to run toward the fight for a look, indicated that foreseeable
public disturbance must be substantial indeed before it qualifies
under the statute. 85 Given the statute and the judicial decision, I
concluded that if the facts were found accurately, the boys were
clearly not guilty of the offense. A knowledgeable colleague suggested to me that for the police and some judges in the summons
part of the criminal court that handles these cases, any voluntary
fight in a public park may count as disorderly conduct. The vast
majority of those charged simply plead guilty, knowing that they
face only a small fine, and virtually no one convicted after an informal hearing bothers to appeal. If this possibility were realized, the
law as it is administered would cover much more than "the law on
the books. " 86
Another type of divergence between the law "in practice" and
the "law on the books" reaches serious offenses as well as trivial
ones. Prosecutors have the authority to charge a lower offense than
the most grave one committed, and occasionally, in exchange for a
guilty plea, they charge a defendant with an offense that really does
not make sense given the actual facts of the case.
Any examples in which the "law as applied" is more severe
than the "law on the books" raise serious questions of appropriateness, but it is almost universally assumed that police or prosecutors,
or both, act properly in treating behavior more leniently than the
substantive criminal law seems to demand. It is logically possible
that for different officials at different levels, there could be determinate but contrary answers about the law's provisions, or that what
is determinate for officials at one level would be indeterminate for
officials at another level (as I have suggested may be true for wellestablished precedents that a lower court must accept but that a
higher court may overturn). But that is not how police and
prosecutorial latitude is conceived. It is conceived as a discretion
over whether to invoke the full force of the law. In principle it is
not unlike Keith's discretion although here it is guided by considerations of public welfare. Some offenses are so serious that failure to
85. See People v. Pritchard, 27 N.Y.2d 246, 265 N.E.2d 532, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 4
(1970).
86. The case was disposed of by an adjournment contemplating dismissal, so no
decision on the merits was reached, but my acquaintance had the impression that the
judge involved would have tried to apply faithfully the law of the statute and the court
of appeals.
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proceed with-the full force of the law may be criticized; but prosecutors "charge down" even for terrible murders in exchange for information and testimony about other participants. Although what
courts interpreting the law may decide about many actions Jnay be
determined objectively by the law, how those actions should be
treated overall by the law is not determinate because of discretionary enforcement elements. This conclusion applies to Olive's
situation.
It i~ important that the law's treatment of situations in this
broader sense is not fully determined even when appijcation of the
law is clear. · A proponent of invariable indeterminacy might say
that dividing the substantive law from discretionary elements is arbitrary; without such a division, discretion would undermine a
claim that positive application87 of a legal rule is determinate. I
think this attack should be resisted because in the civil cases, it
makes good sense to distinguish the law from a party's decision to
invoke the law, and the same is true of criminal enforcement. In
any event, the conceptual point is not critical. I could revise the
thesis of frequent determinacy to talk about particular officials and
particular choices. I could say, "For a judge faced with the legal
question of whether Olive is liable under the ordinance, the law provides the determinate answer that she is." Similarly, for a police
officer, prosecutor, or judge faced with the legal question of whether
Paul (who kept his dog on a leash) violated the ordinance, the law
provides a determinate answer that he did not.

VI.

DISOBEDIENCE AND NORMATIVE AUTHORITY

It remains to ask what relevance a legal rule has for the overall
actions of a judge, or other official, assuming that the law itself confers no discretion to disregard its terms.
As with ·my ·nonlegal examples, the question of what a legal
rule requires is not the same as the question of whether either a
citizen or official should comply. In law, the dicho~omy between
the two questions is not always sharp. Since the authority to determine what legal norms mean may be in dispute, an official may reject dominant understandings about some matters and ·still be
faithful to his defensible view of the law. But normative discretion
has limits. A trial judge who makes up a wholly new form of crimi87. I talk of "positive application" because proper exercises of discretion do not
permit officials to apply legal standards that do not exist. Discretion, thus, does not
threaten the conclusion that negative answers to legal questions-is Nick's scratching of
his nose murder?-are often determinate.
·
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nal liability without statutory support has failed.to observe the law,
whatever his state of mind. And I have argued that in Olive's case,
a lower court judge is not free to substitute a nonliteral interpretation which focuses on control for an explicit requirement that a dog
be leashed.
.
Someone who agrees that the law provides an answer need not
conclude thal an official, even a judge, should follow it. The law of
1840 may have required the retuni of a fugitive slave, but a judge
could have decided to free a slave before him by malting an erroneous finding about het identity. Imagine that Judith is a judge who is
radically dissatisfied with the overregulation of legal norms. She
thinks judges should be explicitly allowed to reject legislative forms
of regulation that they believe are undesirable. If Olive argues to
Judith that the value of having dogs run free outweighs any interest
in leashing, should Judith disregard present law and try to create
better law?
·
·
No absolute general principle of.. morality bars Judith's deciding contrary to her understanding of the law's, provisions. However, strong reasons oppose that course. In taldng office, Judith has
sworn to uphold the law. She has agreed to perform a job as conceived in a certain way. If she wanders too far, away from the
widely understood job description, she has failed to keep her promise to perform that job. 88 Moreover, people in a society base reasonable and justified expectations on the law's provisions. When
private rights are contested, a raqically innovative decision defeats
the expectations of the losing party. Nothing quite so direct occurs
if Judith lets Olive off because of the former's novel.belief of who
should make law. But other park ·users may have depended upon
the enforcement of the ordinance, and the ordinance .may even represent a conscious compromise between excluding dogs from the
park altogether and allowing them to run free. Judith's ruling will
deny the park's other users the fruits of political agreement. Were
Judith's approach to. legal norms generalized, the law would yield
much less stability in social relations. Shared understandings not
only constitute an aspect of the law, they exert extral~gal normative
force on tllose who interpret the law. in favor of compliance rather
than disregard ...
88. See generally Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518, 527 (1986).
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VII.

DETERMINATE ANSWERS UNDER GENERAL STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES OF
COMMON LAW

Having established that the nonapplication or application of
specific statutory rules is often determinate, I now examine standards whose general language does not yield answers as straightforwardly or whose own status may be subject to challenge. If the
application of such standards is invariably indeterminate, then the
practical significance of what I have shown thus far will be sharply
limited. I treat broad statutory and constitutional standards before
briefly discussing the force of common law standards.
Applications of legal rules are subject to traditional privileges
and excuses and to constitutional challenges. A narrow rule like
the leashing requirement will apply against Olive only if claims by
her on those bases fail. If the answer to those claims is always indeterminate, we could never conclude that application of the ordinance is determinate. Nonapplication of the specific rule could be
determinate, as in the case of Paul whose dog was leashed, but with
respect to Olive, application would always depend on how the
broader claims are evaluated, and the analysis of these would not be
determinate.
A.

Nonapplication of the General Justification Defense

American criminal codes contain a number of justifications,
like self-defense, and excuses, like insanity. When the criminal
codes themselves are silent, similar defenses derived from the common law are effective.
I concentrate on the broadest justification, the necessity defense or general justification. The formulation in the Model Penal
Code, an important model for actual legislatures, is:
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself or to another is justl.fiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged . . . .89
Further subsections make the defense inapplicable if other provisions, such as self-defense, specifically deal with the situation, or if a
legislative purpose to exclude the justification plainly appears.
89. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (198S). The Commentary to the Code indicates
the wide variations on this formulation that have been adopted and gives the content of
other formulations. The main problem I discuss in the text is relevant for any
formulation.

J
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The language of this standard is so broad and open-ended that
an argument that application is always indeterminate appears more
promising for it than for other defenses. 90 If application of the general justification defense is never foreclosed, positive application of
any specific provision of the criminal law is always indeterminate
because no action will both be plainly in violation of the particular
provision and be unwarranted under the general justification defense. More concretely, if Olive raises general justification claims
whose resolution is not determinate, final application of the leashing
ordinance to her is not determinate.
What claims might Olive make for letting her dog run free?
Olive's arguments might be about dogs in general, about Max, or
about her own status. Suppose Olive claims that the value of having
dogs free outweighs the benefits of leashing. 91 The conclusive argument against this claim is that if it were accepted, it effectively
would eliminate the leashing ordinance. Were dogs generally able
to run free because of this defense, no dogs, except perhaps a few
demonstrably dangerous ones, would have to be leashed under the
ordinance. 92 The legislature was not aiming for that limited end
when it adopted a broad rule requiring leashing. The general justifi90. If all of the defenses are sometimes determinate and sometimes not, instances
will arise, of course, in which the general justification defense is determinate and some
other defense, like insanity, is not. But in some instances, when nonapplication of the
general justification defense is determinate, nonapplication of the other defenses will
also be determinate, and criminal liability will follow if a rule making certain behavior
criminal applies.
91. A threshold difficulty with this argument is that the defense talks only about
the harm to "himself" or "another," presumably human beings, but we can assume that
the harm of a dog's not being healthy and happy is a harm to the owner. A second
threshold Jifliculty Olive faces is that one harm to be avoided by leashing is serious
injury to human beings from dog bites. It is hard to argue that that harm is not a more
serious harm than the harm that results from leashing a dog. The answer to this threshold difficulty is that probabilities matter; avoidance of a near certain harm may be warranted even if that slightly increases the chance of a more serious harm. For example,
breaking the speed limit sometimes may be warranted for reasons less than saving life
even though the risk that someone will be killed is slightly increased.
92. Olive might respond that granting her the defense would not in fact undermine
the ordinance because it carries such slight penalties most people would simply pay
their fines without hiring a lawyer or contesting the matter in court. Olive's victory
would be unknown , or not worth invoking, for most dog owners. This response flies in
the face of a premise of our legal system that courts should not consciously declare
rights that they would be unwilling to declare if the rights were to be widely declared
and acted upon by individuals and enforcement agencies. I do not say this "principle of
legality" is never violated by courts, but it largely undercuts the force of Olive's argument. Further, if the legislature has decided most dogs should be leashed, and the court
thinks that judgment should not be undermined, her making of a contrary argument is
not a good reason to make an exception in Olive's case.
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cation defense is not now understood as authorizing judicial overthrow of legislative judgments. Further, this particular version of
the defense forecloses its use when a legislative purpose to exclude
the justification plainly appears. Adoption of the ordinance evidences a legislative purpose to exclude a justification so broad that it
would effectively eliminate the ordinance.
A counterargument by Olive might challenge the assumption
that the court should defer to the legislative judgment that dogs
should generally be leashed. 93 One possibility worilci be to concede
legislative power to restrain judges, but deny that the legislature
had exercised it here. Olive might say:
The judiciary in a legal system might operate as a general
check on legislative judgments about criminality, especially judgments by inferior legislatures like city councils. Under such a
scheme, invocation of the general justification defense would be
appropriate for courts that deem particular legislation unwise.
In such a system, a legislature might be able to block the use of
the general justification defense, but only by stating a specific intent to do that. Our system should be so understood. The simple
passing of the ordinance should not be conceived of as a plain
indication of a legislative purpose to exclude the justification, and
the general claim that the ordinance is misconceived for most
dogs should be open to judicial examination.

Up to a certain point, Olive's argument is plausible. A legal system
could operate in this way, and a general justification defense in such
a system might have the language of this general justification defense. Thus, the language of the defense alone, assigned its ordinary
significance in English, does not preclude Olive's prevailing on her
claim that the legislative judgment about leashing dogs is unsound.
But the system she presumes is not ours. The general justification
defense is not understood by legislators, lawyers, and scholars who
think about these matters as authorizing such judicial power. In the
context of the assumptions of our system, the ordinance itself, supported by the portion of the general justification defense that excludes its use when a legislative purpose to do so plainly appears,
forecloses this general argument of Olive.
Olive might explicitly grant that existing premises of legislative
supremacy would defeat her, but urge that the judge should acquit
Olive because our system would be better if judges interposed their
93. In a controversial 1917 case, a court took a different view of the status of the
defense and referred to it as as one resting on "natural rights" that "cannot be taken
away by statute." Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation
Case, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 264, 267 (1961) (quoting Amer. Print Works v. Lawrence, 21
N.J.L. 248, 257 (1847), rev'd, Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714 (1848)).
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judgments about desirable criminal liability much more freely. As I
have suggested with respect to Sam's carrying out of the responsibilities of subordinate, a judge who acted upon this argument
would not be playing by the rules of the enterprise. Olive is asking
the judge to reach an answer different from the one the law, including the basic assumptions of the system, now requires.
If Olive relies on special features of Max or herself, she calls for
the kind of individuation and equitable qualification of legislative
classifications that the general justification defense evidently demands. She might say about Max: 1) he is so well trained he poses
no danger if unleashed; 2) he is specially in need of exercise; or 3) he
is intrinsically more valuable than other dogs, so his physical and
emotional well-being are more important. Unfortunately for Olive,
none of these claims presents the right kind of exceptional circumstance. Many dogs are well enough trained not to present dangers
in the park; as Part IV indicates, a legislature would write a different ordinance if it wanted courts to assess the exercise needs of particular dogs or the risks they pose to human beings. Moreover,
practical administration of this minor ordinance could be compromised if police and courts had to assess these matters. 94 The response to Olive's claim that Max is simply more valuable than other
dogs is that much of. the law reflects the view that privileges for
dogs do not depend· either on their market value or upon their owners' subjective valuation. Unless Olive can specify some feature that
distinguishes Max more distinctively, a judge who complies with
the rules of his enterprise must reject the defense.
The same conclusion applies for most of the claims that Olive
might make based on her own status. Suppose she argues that Max
gets exercise twice as fast when he is off of the leash and this allows
her mQre time to study for her law school courses, which is of tremendous importance to society. Neither our law nor our culture
recognizes legal study as of such preeminent importance that those
who engage in it should be relieved from ordinary legal restrictions
when freedom from these restrictions would save them time.
Therefore, rejection of this claim is also required.

a

94. Olive might counter that few owners would contest summons for failing to
leash dogs. This argument resembles that considered and rejected above in note 92, but
its acceptance would be somewhat less offensive to· principles of legality. Many dogs
must be leashed; if owners of dogs who do not need to be leashed must decide whether
to establish that in court or pay a small fine, that is not as troublesome as having a
system in which the great majority of those penalized are not appropriately subject to
the penalty, the problem discussed above in note 92.
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In sum, when the purposes of the leashing ordinance, the need
to administer it in some comprehensible fashion, and the law and
culture's reflection of the value of dogs and people are considered,
Olive's arguments for applying the general justification defense are
not only unconvincing, but highly implausible and even silly. In a
society sometime and someplace, with no linguistic alteration in the
general justification provision, one of these arguments might persuade, but for this time and this place the result these arguments
urge is objectively wrong. It would be wrong because interpretation
within a system requires reference to the values embodied in the
system and to the understandings of those participating in and subject to the system. Despite the open-endedness of the general justification defense, the law determines that here it does not cancel the
application of the more specific language of the leashing ordinance.

B. Nonapplication of Constitutional Limits
Since its analysis is closely similar to that of the general justification defense, I shall be brief in considering the possibility that
application of the leashing ordinance to Olive is indeterminate because it could be overridden by the indeterminate application of
some federal or state constitutional norm. For the sake of convenience, I concentrate on the equal protection clause and the due process and privileges and immunities clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
Olive might claim that the classification improperly discriminates against dog owners in comparison to other users of the park,
such as owners of monkeys, bicycle riders, and parents of children
in the park. 95 The constitutional language is open-ended enough to
lend itself to invalidation of the ordinance on the grounds of improper discrimination, but now firmly settled constitutional doctrine is that legislatures have room to adopt rules that implicitly
distinguish along any of these lines. Conceiving of any argument
for altering this position that is tied to other basic premises of our
constitutional order is difficult. The group that is "discriminated
against" lacks the characteristics of disadvantage that might lead a
court to expand protection to it without drastically shifting the
whole landscape of equal protection doctrine.
95. The fourteenth amendment applies only to "persons," and dogs do not qualify.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. Although that definition could change over time (especially
if it were learned that dogs have a high intelligence), I assume that, barring some astonishing factual discoveries, a contemporary judge could not properly hold that dogs
themselves are persons directly protected by the amendment.
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An argument that the ordinance violates due process or privileges and immunities would have to rely on some claimed fundamental right of Olive's. Since a right to have dogs unleashed in
parks is hardly a traditional basic right, the right would have to be
found in a category of rights that is expandable in light of fundamental cultural values. The right Olive claims is so far removed
from fundamental cultural values and from rights that now enjoy
constitutional protection, that a judge would have to depart from
the rules of the enterprise in declaring such a right. In the future
our law and culture may value higher animals much more than they
do now, and a leashing ordinance may appear to be unwarranted
cruel treatment of dogs that deserve protection through the claims
of owners' rights. However, until some movement in that direction
transpires, a judge would not be justified in declaring such rights.
Despite the open language of relevant constitutional provisions,
their nonapplication to Olive and Max is determinate.
C. Positive Application of the General Justification Defense and
Constitutional Limits

In the last two sections, I have suggested that non application
of justifications and constitutional rights is sometimes determinate.
Do general standards of this type ever plainly apply, leading to a
conclusion that despite the evident application of a more specific
provision, the law objectively does not forbid the behavior involved?
My unsurprising answer is "yes."
Max is a big dog who has been trained to save young children
from the water. Olive is walking in the park with Max on a leash
and sees a small baby fifty yards away who has fallen into a pool
three feet deep, while her parents are chatting with friends. Olive
releases Max who runs to save the baby, and does so. A police
officer whose vision is obscured by trees sees only Olive's release
of Max; when he comes upon Olive twenty minutes later he issues a summons. He does not then believe her story, and the
parents have departed with their baby. Olive manages to find the
parents who testify in court as to the accuracy of her account.

In this circumstance the general justification defense undoubtedly applies. Given the high value placed on human life in our law
and culture, and the slight risk that Max will do serious harm in the
brief time he is unleashed, a judge who believes Olive's account is
required to find that the general justification defense applies.
My constitutional law example departs from variations on the
theme of Olive and Max.
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The council' of a to~, most of whose working residents earn
over $50,000 a year, votes that only residents who are members
of families earning $25,000 or more will be eligible to use the
public swimming pool. The rationale for the decision is that the
well-to-do residents will feel more comfortable if they can use the
facility without having to associate with poor residents.
_

No Supreme Court case has presented quite this issue, and I do not
think any rules drawn from cases that it has decided directly preciude this strategy, but the swimming pool regulation is nonetheless
a blatant violation of the equal protection clause, as now conceived.
The sense of equal protection jurisprudence is that any effort to
limit community services on the basis of family income would be
"suspect" or "disfavored," and preservation of the pool serenity of
the well-to-do would be a patently inadequate reason to justify the
classification. 96 One can say comfortably that constitutional law as
it presently exists determines the unconstitutionality of this strategy. At least for a judge who is not on the Supreme Court, 97 "the
law" yields an objective answer that the ordinance is
unconstitutional.

D.

The Determinacy of the Common Law-The Absence of
Canonical Formulations and the Possibilities of Overruling

Once it is determined that some statutory. and constitutional
questions may have determinate answers, doubt may still exist
about whether the answ~rs to questions of common law can ever be
determinate in the sense that I have spoken of. One possible doubt
concerns the formulation of standards of common law; it is sometimes said that no formulation is canonical. The other possible
96. K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CrrlzENSHIP AND THE CoN141 (i989), suggests that the more a particulaf inequality tends to stigmatize, the more should be demanded in the way of justification. This wealth classification
powerfully stigmatizes.
97. Probably this case does not yield a determinate answer for a Supreme Court
justice, at least not in the very narrow sense of "determinate" that I use in this Article.
Since some judges and others in the professional community "?VOuld argue competently
for a contrary conclusion, a Supreme Court Justice could reach such an answer without
violating universally shared norms of the legal community and general populace. Some
people believe that the original language as historically intended is the only proper basis
for an equal protection decision. More specifically, they assert that the Supreme Court
has been mistaken in treating wealth discrimination as presumptively invalid under the
equal protection clause (albeit the people that say this are usually thinking about the
"indirect" wealth discrimination of charging set fees for vital services, not the explicit
and direct wealth discriminatiori of my example). A Supreme Court Justice might decide that despite contrafY precedent, the equal protection clause henceforth should be
limited to racial discrimination and closely related forms of ethnic discrimination. That
position has some limited support in the legal community.
STITUTION
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doubt concerns the authority of courts to overrule_ tµeir own precedents. If courts can alter the law, how can the answer to any question be determinate? I should note at the outset that insofar as
these aspects of the common law are threatening to any thesis that
some cases have determinate answers, the threat extends to statutory and constitutional conclusions whose authority depends upon
prior judicial decisjons. A judicial formulation of a relatively precise standard that governs freedom of speech under the first amendment has itself no mote of a canonical status than a judicial
formulation of a common law rule. I deal with both doubts about
determinacy relatively quickly.
1.

No Canonical Formulation

Common law rules do not have canonical formulations because
the scope of a rule may be cast in different ways. A contrast may be
drawn between the common law, on the one hand, and statutes and
constitutions on the other. The language of a statute or constitution
is the language to which a court must refer; that language represents an authoritative formulation. But when courts offer formulations of common law rules in th~ir .opinions, those formulations, at
least typically, 98 are not uniquely authoritative in the same way. A
future court may accept or offer an alternative formulation as capturing the existing rule as well or better. The different ways in
which a rule may be cast may have different iinp,Ucations for the ·
resolution of some situations. If alternative formulations are always
possible, can any case be resolved definitively by a common law
rule?
The answer is fairly simple. Ordinarily the various formulations are cast with certain core situations in mind, those resolved by
the courts in one way or another. Suppose "hearsay" evidence is to
be excluded. Witness A is to testify that B told' him that she (B)
saw C steal money. If A's testimony is to be used directly to show
that C stole money, i~ is hearsay evidence and, barring some exception,99 is not admissible. More generally, some· cases will achieve
the same results under any plausible formulations of common law
rules that remain faithful to the rules as they then exist,· Put differently, all plausible formulations will have some overlapping content.
98. Some common law rules on technical subjects may have formulations that are
repeated enough times that a particular formulation is taken distinctly auihoritative.
99. Lest it be said that ~me "exception" may be infinitely malleable, we need to
remember that there will be standard situations that do not arguably fall within any
exception.

as
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Certain common law formulations lack the precision associated with rules. These broader standards call on judges or jurors to
make an assessment of proper or reasonable behavior. Rules so formulated still may yield determinate answers, as does the general
justification defense, when values drawn from the law or culture
leave no doubt about the proper outcome. 100
2.

Overruling

If courts explicitly overrule existing common law cases, or
drastically alter the coverage of common law rules, does that undermine the determinacy of applications of common law? Since lower
courts may be required to adhere more closely to existing rules than
the court that has established them, this concern about determinate
results is particularly great for the latter court. In cases in which
overruling is appropriate, one cannot say a decision that follows the
narrow existing law is objectively required. But not every case falls
into that category; shared understandings limit the appropriateness
of overruling.
A rule of common law dealing with real property is challenged
before the state supreme court that established it. The rule concerns an aspect of property law which requires a settled rule. All
of the courts in the state have followed the rule for thirty years
since the original decision, and the rule has been relied upon
heavily in many property transactions. The argument offered for
overruling it is that when the rule initially was laid down, the
reasons for a contrary rule were marginally stronger.

As hard as it is to say when our traditions permit overruling, this is
not such a case. This situation is one in which any court would say
that even if it would have been better if the initial decision had come
out the other way, the rule is too firmly settled to be disturbed,
absent some serious claim of present injustice or significantly
changed circumstances. The law, that is, the old rule plus the vague
traditions controlling overruling, determine that the rule should be
applied to the new case.
Whether this analysis of common law cases can be extended to
constitutional and statutory cases is debatable. Although our dominant and sound tradition also ·gives precedents weight in statutory
and constitutional cases, it is even harder to decide when overruling
them is appropriate. For my strict standard of what counts as a
determinate answer, a conclusion for a statutory or constitutional
100. Indeed, the general justification defense itself remains a common law defense in
many jurisdictions.
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case that might otherwise be appropriate probably cannot be foreclosed by precedential decisions to the contrary.·
VIII.

LAW'S DETERMINACY AND THEORIES OF
INTERPRETATION

Thus far my analysis has been uncluttered by many references
to broader theories that might be relied upon to support the thesis
that. applications· of law are invariably indeterminate. In the remainder of the Article, I devote my attention to the argument that
applications of law depend upon interpretation, that legal interpretation is a species of interpretation in general, that all interpretation
depends upon the subjective attributes of the interpreter, and that,
therefore, no interpretive question has an objectively correct answer.tot The last decade has witnessed a proliferation of writing
about the manner in which legal interpretation relates to other
forms of interpretation, and enlightened views about interpretation
in other spheres are sometimes thought to teach lessons about indeterminacy in law. One would be foolish to deny the fruitfulness of
such comparisons, but one must also be very cautious in assimilating insights from other exercises in interpretation. No relevant insight supports invariable indeterminacy.·
We can identify at least five varieties of interpretation that involve constructive understanding: legal interpretation; religious or
theological interpretation; literary interpretation; reproductive interpretation (as in producing plays and performing music); and interpretation in the human sciences (history, anthropology and so
forth). 102 Interpretation may be of documents or practices or something else (like dreams). The aim of interpretation may be descriptive, to inform others of some aspect of reality, or normative, to
indicate desirable action or exhibit what is good, or a combination
of the two. The object of interpretation may be to answer a particular question or yield a much broader account of what is important.
Various relationships of authority may exist between the interpreter
and what is interpreted and between the interpreter and· the community within which he interprets. Not all of these distinctions
101. In Law and Objectivity I also consider claims based on scientific indeterminacy
or a general indeterminacy of rules. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 1.
102. I have not included the interpretation involved when a listener tries to ascertain
what a speaker has said or when one language is translated into another. I also have not
included ordinary scientific interpretation. R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, comments illuminatingly about the relationship between creative interpretation and conversational
and scientific interpretation;
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may be crucial with respect to indeterminacy, but each deserves examination. The attractions of fresh perspectives and weighty intellectual names is not a substitute for careful analysis of the
importance of broader ideas about interpretation for the determinacy of law.
A.

The Subjectivity of Interpretation

Much modem writing on interpretation, or hermeneutics, emphasizes the inevitability of an interpreter's reliance upon his own
presuppositions as he interprets a text or practice. Further, since
the point of interpretation is to ascertain something relevant for interpreters and those to whom they may communicate, this inevitability generally is not to be regretted, but welcomed, and it is
questionable whether the interpreters should even attempt to submerge their own particular presuppositions. As Hans-Georg
Gadamer, one of the most profound hermeneutical theorists, writes,
"A law is not there to be understood historically, but to be made
concretely valid through being interpreted." 103 He goes on to say
that for a religious proclamation to be understood properly for its
saving effect, it "must be understood at every moment, in every particular situation, in a new and different way." 104
In a leading American comparison of legal interpretation and
literary interpretation, Sanford Levinson talks about law as "the
creation of willful interpreters .... " 105 He suggests that "the very
multiplicity (if not promiscuity) of Justice John Marshall's approaches to interpretation ... calls into question whether interpretation for Marshall (or for anyone else) ever transcended a desire to
achieve specific political results." 106 Levinson emphasizes the absence of authorial intent in jointly authored documents to counter
the possibility that author's intent might provide a fixed standpoint
for interpretation.101
The inevitability that the interpreter's perspectives will color
an interpretive effort should cause us to pause before we assert that
one objectively correct interpretation of a law, or anything else, is
always present. But lest we be overcome by skepticism, we need to
revert to the idea that language is communal, that those who share
a common language and culture will often understand that the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 275 (1975).
Id.
Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 374 (1982).
Id. at 375.
.
Id. at 379.
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meaning of sentences in context includes some things and excludes
others. A speaker's meaning and a reasonable listener's understanding will often converge on standard instances. The subjectivity of interpretation does not itself bar a conclusion that questions
about meaning can often be answered with confidence, that an answer can be objectively right or wrong.
Of course, as I indicated earlier, someone might say that interpretation is required only when the meaning and its respective application are noi transparently clear in the situation at hand, but the
critical question is whether authoritative legal standards produce
definite answers to questions in many circumstances, not what qualifies as interpretation. Although the categorization is not important
for my purpose, I shall assume in what follows, as do many of those
writing on interpretation, that even deriving simple answers from
texts involves interpretation. 108

B. Descriptive or Normative Interpretation
As one compares legal interpretation with theological interpretation, literary criticism, 109 and interpretation in the human sciences, one immediately draws a distinction between descriptive and
normative interpretation. Theological and legal interpretation, and
perhaps literary criticism, may be regarded as mainly normative because they seek to indicate what things are worthwhile and worth
achieving as well as how one should live. Interpretation in the
human sciences may be regarded as descriptive because it aims to
reveal what exists and occurs. This dichotomy has some signifi~
cance, but it is much less sharp than it appears at first glance. Furthermore, it has relatively little bearing on the issue of deterininafe
answers.
A distinction between descriptive and normative interpretation
could focus either on the purpose of the interpreter or the interpreter's understanding of what he interprets. A historian may be~
lieve that ancient Greek texts establish Greek conceptions of moral
duty. The historian's purpose would be descriptive, to explain to
others how the Greeks perceived their moral duty, but he would be
108. For similar reasons, I do not explore other possible categorizations in the process of applying norms. On a traditional distinction between interpretation and application, see E.D. HIRSCH, supra note 40, at 19.
109. I shall not consider the reproductive interpretation involved in the staging of
plays and the playing of music because it seems to have the least relevance for our
purposes, and for those purposes I am not sure it is significantly distinguishable from
literary criticism.
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seeking a normative understanding. On the other hand, a person
approaching the Bible as an aid to decide how to live finds a text
that contains a good deal about human history and human motivations. Biblical interpreters with primarily normative objectives may
engage in much interpretation that is essentially descriptive.
Matters are complicated still further. First, the objectives and
understandings of interpreters often will be mixed. Why would a
historian be interested in how Greeks perceived their moral duty?
Probably he will suppose that increased knowledge about Greek
conceptions will assist us in deciding how to live our lives now. 110
Second, the initial understanding that the interpreter brings to the
subject to be interpreted will not have discrete normative and descriptive elements. The interpreter typically will engage in some
normative evaluation when he aims to provide a descriptive account, and his sense of empirical reality will influence whatever normative lessons he derives from what he is interpreting. Third, an
understanding of a culture's norms is not easily separable from an
understanding of its history and of other of its elements that are not
obviously normative. 111 If legal interpretation is fundamentally
normative, that is, if it deals with questions of what people should
do, an aspect of much legal interpretation is construction of what
people are like and what they aim to achieve. In sum, no identifiable normative interpretation stands neatly separable from descriptive interpretation.
Does it matter for the possibility of determinate answers
whether normative judgments are subject to the same criteria of
truth or falsehood as descriptive judgments? 112 At a simple level, a
proposal that this possible difference demarcates descriptive interpretation from normative interpretation confuses the criteria for validity of direct normative claims with the criteria for accuracy of
interpretations. Normative interpretation concerns the normative
perspective of texts or practices. A text may provide a definite an110. In an epilogue to her account of early Christian understandings, ADAM, EVE,
THE SERPENT 151-54 (1988), Elaine Pagels indicates that she initially studied the
origins of Christianity in the hope of finding the "real Christianity." She discovered
that historical inquiry "most often does not solve religious questions but can offer new
perspectives upon these questions." Id. at 153.
111. See generally Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Ronald Dworkin has suggested that propositions of law "are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description ar,d evaluation but is different from both." Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60
Tux. L. REV. 527, 528 (1982).
112. Those who think that they are not may believe normative judgments are not
subject to truth or falsity at all, or are subject to different criteria of truth or falsity.
AND
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swer to what one should do, even if there is no correct answer to the
question of whether one really should do that, all things considered.113 If Beth tells Sam that the temperature is sixty-five degrees
fahrenheit and that he should shut the door, there is no reason to
think that her normative direction is harder to understand, or is less
definite in its implications, than her descriptive assertion.
At a deeper level, this problem is more serious. Suppose a text
or practice is interpreted by someone who assigns a very high authority to it. This interpreter will be strongly disinclined to say that
what he is interpreting indicates that he should do one thing, but
that overall he should do something else. If the implications of the
materials being interpreted are interwoven with other criteria of
normative judgment, the interpreter may not wish to say that the
materials yield definite answers of a kind that are not possible for
overall normative judgments. Thus, those who believe that what we
should do overall is determined by time, place, and perspective, and
who believe that the Bible has high authority, are unlikely to find
that the Bible forbids every act of adultery in every social
circumstance.
I have strongly urged, nevertheless, that normative interpretation is ordinarily not identical with overall judgment about the actions one should take. Certainly as far as the law of human beings
is concerned, one may say that the law indicates that a person
should act in one way, but that action in a different way is better
overall. 114 In many instances one's view of the authority of a text
may influence how one interprets or applies it, but that truth does
not mean that all or most normative interpretation is indistinguishable from judgment about what one should do overall. 115
Legal interpretation is essentially normative. Comparisons are
likely to be more illuminating between it and forms of interpretation
that are normative, in either the sense of seeking normative understanding or in the sense of being directed toward choice, than between it and forms of interpretation that are normative in neither
sense. But the normative character of legal interpretation is not it113. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 751 (1982)
("What is being interpreted is a text, and the morality embodied in that text, not what
individual people believe to be the good or right.").
114. Even someone who thought evil laws did not count as laws could admit such a
possibility, because some good laws have unfortunate applications.
115. I put aside the view that all normative judgment involves interpretation. Even
on that view, some kinds of normative interpretation, of the law or of social practices,
would not be finally determinative of what one should do. A broader interpretation, say
of moral duty or justice, would be required.
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self a reason ,to suppose that answers to legai questions will be more
or less capable of definiteness than answers to other kinds of interpretive questions.
Much more important are the three other subjects to which I
now tum: (1) the specificity of the inquiry; (2) the degree to which
different answers are mutually exclusive; and (3) the relationships
between the interpreter and what is being interpreted and between
the interpreter and the community in which he is situated.
C. How Specific Is the Inquiry?
The possibility of a· determinate, objectively correct answer depends considerably upon the nature of the question asked. When
comparisons ·are drawn between literary and legal interpretation~
the questions in literary interpretation often involve the interpretation of a particular work or character. 116 Given subtle differences
and gradations one might interpret a work in an infinite number of
ways. If someone asks how the Constitution is to be interpreted and
conceives the Constitution as embodying· our public values, one
might also find, including variations on major •theipes, ·an infinite
number 'of ways in which to interpret the Constitution. But as
scholars have often pointed out, many of the structural parts of the
Constitution are quite specific, and if one asks whether an eighteen
year old English rock star with no, claim, to American nationality
permissibly serve as President of the United States, the document
yields a definite answer, "No."
Much of the same range of interpretation applies in an analysis
of literature. Suppose the following questions are asked about Dostoyevsky's novel, The Brothers Karamazov: "Does. Fyodor
Karamozov,:the father, remain alive (in the literal sense) at the end
of the novel?"; "Is Dmitry Karamozov, the oldest son, one of the
fifteen most important characters in the novel?" The answer to the
first question is clearly "no"; the answer to the second is clearly
"yes." The answer t~ the first question requires only superficial attention to the events described. If one takes them at face value, it is
as certain that Fyodor dies during the novel as that John F. Kennedy died during his term as President; For any actual historical
event, it is always conceivable that people have been the victim of
an incredibly elaborate hoax or that they have lost contact with reality; therefore, we might be wrong about John F. Kennedy's death.
116. Levinson says, for example, that there are as many plausible readings of the
Constitution as of Hamlet. Levinson, supra note 105, at 391.
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Perhaps it is also conceivable to interpret Dostoyevsky's novef as
really involving an elaborate hoax, in which the main characters of
the novel, and the reader, are fooled about the death·of the father.
But such an interpretation is not just now "off the wall"; one is hard
put to conceive how 'in the future· people capable of understanding
Russian would embrace it. A degree of judgment is involved in determining whether Dmitry is one of the fifteen most important
characters, but it is hard to imagine how one could rank· fifteen
other individuals in the novel as more important than him. (If the
position is taken that the answers to these questions ·do not really
require interpretation (in the relevant sense), that shows that literary interpretation. builds on· features of literary works as to which
determinate, objective answers can be. provided. If law is similar,
the place of a significant number of determinate answers is secure.)
My suggestions about literary analysis also apply to the interpretation of theological texts. A recent book describes the manner
in which small groups relate biblical p~sages to personal experiences in order to give free flow to their imaginations. 117 No specific
narrow: question is at issue in the process, and the idea that there is
a single "correct" meaning to a passage is antithetical to the kind of
"interpretation" in which the participants engage. 118 . On the other
hand, if the questions are put: "Is Jesu_s of Nazareth the most important character µi human formit 9 in the account of the four gospels?"; "Do biblical passages indicate that concern for others is
desirable?"; and "Does the Bible overall suggest that God cares
about human beings?" the answer to each question is undeniably
"yes."
.
.
..
.
Many ordinary_critical questions in law take an either-or form.
One might: object that many substantive legal doctrines,· such as
comparative ·negligence and punitive damages, 'do not take this
form. One might also object that the competitive either-or aspects
of law are undesirable features that should be scrapped. I believe
117. W. ABERNETHY & P. MAYHER, ScRIFl'URE

AND

IMAGINATION (1988).

i 18. Michael Moore indicates various ways in which psychoanalytic interpretation
of dreams may be understood. Moore, supra note 5, at 917-41. One way is that dream
interpretation is not constrained by explanations of what caused the dream. A "successful" interpretation is one that helps the patient. Id. at 927.
119. It is hard to put this 'question in a short fonQ that yields a definite answer. If I
asked if Jesus were the most important human being, some might respond that he was
not really a human being (although that answer is at odds with orthodox Christian
theology). If I asked if he were the most important person, some might respond that
God is a person and God is the most important person. But my question is' aimed at
comparing Jesus to ordinary human beings who appear in the gospels.

72

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

that no enlightened system of justice could eliminate all either-or
questions; here it is enough to stress that many legal questions are
now either-or. Does a particular court have jurisdiction to consider
a case? Can the death penalty be imposed? May a judge order a
witness to testify about whether a defendant stole jewelry if the witness has not yet been tried or-granted immunity, the theory of the
prosecution is that the witness stood as lookout while the defendant
stole the jewelry, and the witness invokes the privilege against selfincrimination? In most instances, a statute will indicate clearly
whether a court has jurisdiction. No one asserts that a state trial
judge can impose the death penalty in a state whose legislature has
voted explicitly to permit only a range of penalties that does not
include death. No one questions that on these facts, the judge must
accede to an invocation of the privilege against selfincrimination.120
Often unnoticed in discussions of these matters is the fact that
the same legal standard may function in at least five ways: providing
a determinate answer to certain legal questions, providing the basis
for interpretation and application in borderline instances, contributing to a more general view of a document or legal system that influences legal judgments outside of the sphere of the standard's own
arguable coverage, contributing to an understanding of the society
in which we live, and serving as one of many guides to citizens'
treatment of their fellows.
Consider part of the wording of the first amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
inhibiting the free exercise thereof .... " Can Congress establish a
national church 'virtually identical to the Church of England in
1791? The definite answer to this question is "no." Can Congress
provide substantial direct grants to church schools for the education
of ordinary school children? To answer this question the clauses,
and the cases interpreting them, must be interpreted; the answer
remains arguable, but precedents· over the last few decades indicate
that the answer is "no."
May government give "preferences" in hiring to members of
racial minorities which have suffered discrimination? This question
is not addressed under the religion clauses, but they and cases inter120. It is conceivable that the privilege actually has been improperly invoked if the
witness is certain that nothing he truthfully says could possibly be used against him in
any way, but as far as a judge is concerned, a witness has wide latitude to determine
what might be incriminating, and thus on these facts, the judge certainly could not
require the testimony.
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preting them may help inform what is permissible treatment of nonreligious social divisions. The religion clauses may not yield one
determinate correct interpretation with respect to the second and
third legal questions, but that does not mean they fail to produce a
clear answer to the first question. The three levels of legal interpre- ·
tation of the clauses are supplementary, not mutually exclusive.
The religion clauses also help to define an American tradition of
religious freedom and toleration, and citizens may view them as indicating a kind of norm in favor of tolerance, even when personal
intolerance is legally permitted. In these respects, the clauses obviously have no single correct meaning.
D. Mutual Exclusivity of Answers?
I turn now to the s~nd broad inquiry: are different answers to
the same question mutually exclusive? Suppose the question is how
to interpret a character in a novel, such as Alexey Karamazov, the
youngest brother in The Brothers Karamazov. On the surface of the
novel, Dostoyevsky's hero appears to be a very good person, one
with few, if any, malign feelings and aims. One could imagine at
least six different interpretations of his character which: (1) makes
his character as much like that of real people, or some real people,
as is possible; (2) renders him most interesting as a human being; (3)
makes him most appealing from an aesthetic point of view; (4)
presents him in the most helpful way as a moral exemplar; (5) best
fits with Dostoyevsky's own conception; (6) fits best with Russian
thought at the time the novel was written. Perhaps some of the
questions I have put are now considered outside the domain of literary interpretation, but each might be of interest and value for people.121 Different answers could be illuminating and, as long as the
interpreter's standpoint was clear, they would not be mutually exclusive. A person reading various interpretations might conclude
that taking Alexey as he appears on the surface makes him the most
helpful moral exemplar and fits the author's intentions, but that a
more complex "Freudian" reading, in which his caring attitudes
and behavior are the result of repressed hostile feelings toward his
father and brothers that frustrate his chances to develop as an indi121. See E.D. HIRSCH, supra note 40, at 12, 125-39. I do not believe all valuable
interpretations of a piece. of literature attempt "to show which way of reading ... the
text reveals it as the best work of art." Dworkin, supra note 111, at 531; see also R.
DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 50-62. One might think aesthetic value makes something
art, but that interpretation should be in light of moral truth, even when such interpretation marginally reduces aesthetic value.
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vidual, makes him and the novel more interesting and a deeper
work of art. There is no reason that a novel or poem cannot be read
like a piece of music can be heard: in many fruitful ways by the .
same individuai. 122
Essentially the same may be true about much of biblical interpretation. Suppose the effort is not to establish doctrinal truth but
to illuminate one's personal experience. Different ways of understanding a biblical story or parable may yield insight. 123 Perhaps
the individual reader or participant in a study group need not decide which interpretation is most likely correct, but rather can welcome the value of various interpretations. 124
Insofar as legal norms are indicia of cultural premises and possess broad educative value for individuals, people do not need to
settle on a single correct interpretation, but practical questions bearing on legal results are different. The person who considers the legality of behavior is not seeking illumination about life. He wants
to know whether it is all right to engage in a certain action. This
insistent demand for a practical answer does not characterize literary interpretation or the typical interpretation of the human sciences. It is. an aspect of theological interpretation of sacred texts for
those who
think that definite concrete answers about what to be.
lieve and how to live can be drawn from particular texts.
In law, different answers are usually mutually exclusive. If one
lawyer tells a judge that she has jurisdiction, and the other tells the
judge that she does not, the arguments may enlighten the judge's
views about jurisdictional practice, but at the end of the day, she
mµst decide whether to assert jurisdiction. Not all narrow questions that must have an answer will have determinate answers, but
the need for an answer one way or the other undoubtedly has to do
'

122. James B. White says, "It is indeed something of a critical truism that the meaning of a literary work is not in its message but in the experience it off'ers its reader."
White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 Tux. L. REv. 415,
420 (1982). Even when a precise literary question is answered diff'erently by two interpreters, the reader may profit. Suppose the question is: Looking at Alexey himself,
does he represent a better moral exemplar if he is considered not to be motivated by
i:nalign feelings? Answering this question requires deciding one way or the other, but
the reader of competing interpretations may learn something significant about human
n11,ture and the qualities of a moral life from each interpretation.
123. Ronald Garet has pointed out that literal meanings are ordinarily a supplement
or complement to nonliteral readings, and that early Christians did not read the Bible
just literally. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 s. CAL. L. REV. 35, 78-79 (1985). ·
124. See supra note 116. Of course, some interpretations may be both highly implausible and without personal value. Psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams is an interesting parallel. See supra note 117.
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with what has been called by Thomas Grey the "presumption of
literality" of legal materials. 125 The possibilities of determinate answers to questions are much greater when either-or answers must be
given and materials are treated in a relatively literal way than when
many different answers are compatible and nonliteral understandings predominate.

E. Relations of Authority
Relations of authority are easily the most complex variable for
comparisons among different interpretations. With some frequency,
authority in one kind of interpretation is analogized to authority in
another. 126 These illuminating analogies may mislead if salient differences are neglected. My fundamental thesis is that relations of
authority are significantly different in law than in other major kinds
of interpretation, 127 and the special character of authority in law
enhances the likelihood of determinate answers. We need to consider the authority of the text for the interpreter, the authority of
the interpretive community for the interpreter, and the authority of
the interpreter's "reading" for others.
1.

Literary Criticism and Interpretation in the Human Sciences

In literary interpretation, the text of the work is authoritative
because that is what is being interpreted. 128 Critics are not free to
make up different texts that they think might be better. The fact
that the critic has chosen a particular text to interpret ordinarily
shows that he thinks the text is valuable enough to warrant interpretation. That, perhaps, is a kind of authority for the text,
although a critic might pick a text because he strongly objects to its
style or message. Is anything else authoritative? Many texts will, of
125. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1984). Comparing a London Underground notice to a poem, T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 88
(1988), makes the point that interpretation ofa poem is freer because for the notice "the
language is part of a practical situation which tends to rule out certain readings of a text
and legitimate others."
126. See, e.g., Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 676 (1979); Fish, Working on
the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 551, 562 (1982).
127. I concentrate on judicial legal interpretation.. Interpretation by lawyers generally predicts the judges' actions, or plans in light of such predictions, or seeks to persuade judges, and scholarly interpretation often recommends judges' actions.
128. Certain difficulties may arise in deciding what constitutes the text to be interpreted. Suppose an editor has insisted that a certain scene be cut because it will be
offensive to readers. Does the critic take the manuscript as sent to the publisher or as
edited? If it makes a large difference, each can be interpreted.
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course, come pre-interpreted, and pre-interpretations of which a
present critic is aware or that have affected ·discourse about the
work will influence what the critic thinks. More generally, critics
will be placed within a community of discourse about what things
are relevant that will channel their views. And if a critic strays too
far from what is deemed acceptable interpretation, reputation and
career will suffer. A critic's own interpretation may influence
others as prior interpretations have influenced him.
All these types of authority are significantly limited. The·critic
has chosen to interpret a particular text. Not only may he fault
aspects of the work, he may change his mind about its significance.
The pre-interpretations of a text will affect how he comes to regard
the text, but he is free to reject any particular interpretation in favor
of others. There may be no single controlling interpretive approach
at a point in time; rather, a pluralism of approaches may coexist. 129
And instead of following presently dominant methods of interpretation, a critic may revert to some older method or create a relatively
original one. If he gets too far out of step with contemporaries, he
will not be highly regarded in the discipline, but his ambition may
be to reach a narrow section of the general public or to be read one
hundred years from now. He may be willing to accept a lower present status. The concept of academic freedom and the practice of
tenure in part reflect the view that academics should be permitted to
pursue truth as they see it even if they are out of line with their
fellows. The community of interpreters may have the authority of
"inevitable influence" and the authority of "determining the critic's
success" in the profession, but it lacks other authority. It does not
have the authority to tell the critic how to interpret, and if the
critic's views tum out to be bizarre, it' will not be thoughtfully supposed 130 that his failure lies in a failure of duty toward the community unless he has acquired a job under false pretenses, or has
deviated from what he agreed to do, or has acted frivolm~sly.
Neither the text nor the critic's interpretation of it require that he
behave in a certain way toward others in everyday life. Nor does
his interpretation require anyone else to take any specific action.
I shall devote only a few words to the interpreter from the
human sciences who is trying to understand the significance of a
129. See E.D. HIRSCH, supra note 43 on the "fallacy" of the homogeneous present
day perspective.
130. I say "thoughtfully supposed" because people do have some tendency to feel
that friends and associates whose views begin to diverge from their own have "let them
down."
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text or social practice. For the historian, anthropologist, or sociologist, the text or events have an authority in the sense that they are
the subject of interpretation. Like the literary critic, however, each
may choose what he wants to interpret though he may be subject to
criticism if he does not choose an object that has importance for the
purposes of his field. 131 The facts will often be pre-interpreted, and
the interpreter's environment will inevitably influence his perspectives. The relationships between the particular interpreter and the
interpretive community and audience will be similar to those I have
described for literary interpretation. A social science interpretation,
if credited, indicates something about the external world, but does
not, by itself, require action by the interpreter or his audience.
2.

Theological Interpretation

Some matters are different for theological interpreters; exactly
how different will depend upon basic theological views. The theological interpretation I concentrate on here is the interpretation by
an interpreter who seeks to discern religious meaning from texts
with some special religious significance. I omit both the religious
interpretation of an ordinary novel, like Graham Greene's The
Heart of the Matter,1 32 and the interpretation of religious texts like
the Bible "simply as literature" or for historical purposes.
a.

The Authority of Text

For Christians the primary, if not exclusive, ·text with special
religious significance is the Bible (I restrict myself to Christians here
because of my limited understanding of Jewish interpretation of the
Bible). There are variations in the exact status that the Bible is accorded. Some think that on a question that does not permit multiple correct answers, an accurate interpretation of the Bible yields
unquestionable guidance about what to believe and how to live; for
example, "If the Bible forbids adultery, then one should never commit" adultery." 133 One might believe this about each and every part
of the Bible or one might think this about the Bible overall but believe that some of its parts do not have that status. A Christian, for
131. A serious historian would not be expected to analyze with great care the evolution of the rules of baseball; a serious literary critic would not be expected to devote
concentrated attention to The Wife-Swappers. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 n.l (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. G. GREENE, THE HEART OF THE MATTER (1948). Of course, The Brothers
Karamazov, which I have previously mentioned, has a strong religious perspective.
133. There may be intricate problems in deciding what counts as adultery, given the
different practices of marriage and the concept of adultery in ancient Israel.
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example, might think that some Old Testament stories in which
God commands the killing of men, women, and children must not
reflect God's true will or that the book of Ecclesiastes reflects a despairing, atheistic view of human life that does not corr~pond with
the true account in the rest of the Bible. Alternatively, someone
might think that the Bible· is an important and special source of
guidance, but that·other criteria of what to believe and how to live
must be measured against even correct interpretations of the Bible.
Since many Christians believe that in some sense the Bible is the
revealed word of God, the pressure is great to render interpretations
that do not deviate from what they believe overall is correct. A
person may feel quite comfortable saying, "This is what Tolstoy's
essays claim about pacifism, but he was wrong in that respect;"
many Christians will feel much less comfortable saying that about
the letters of St. :Paul that are included in the New Testament. 134
A critical point of disagreement among Christians is whether
other writings or sources. of authority have a status similar to that of
the Bible. The longstanding Roman Catholic view is that the tradition of the Church and the authoritatlve statements of the Church
hierarchy have a similar authority and that for the ordinary believer, the Bible itself is to be understood in light of those sources.
The Protestant view is that the Bible has a unique status, but Protestants may give more or less significance to the judgments of tho~
within the believing community.
With th~ various positions in mind, we can understand the
authority of the text and the interpretive community. On any view
that accords special religious significance to the Bible, it is an important source of enlightenment and guidance about the nature of
reality and how we should live. It has authority for the interpreter
and his audience that is qualitatively different from that of even the
greatest work of literature.

b.

The Authority of the Interpretive Community

The Bible comes to the interpreter pre-interpreted, of course,
and the perspectives of the community of believers through the ages
are an inevitable determinant of the perspectives he brings to bear;
If the interpreter occupies a position within a church or an academic theological institution, his interpretation will affect his
134. Writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin for many years had this status within the
Soviet Union, and the Declaration of Independence has something close to this status in
the United States.
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earthly future. If he is too far "out-of-line" with dominant approaches, he may not advance. But concern for career alone, here
we can see clearly, is hardly the kind of authority that exerts normative force. The interpreter attempts in some sense to discern the
nature and will of God~ and communicate that to an audience now
and in the future. If his contemporary interpreters think he is
crazy, too bad for them; the interpreter, as theological interpreter,
owes a higher obligatiori. 135 Often, however, the interpreter will ~ccord an-in;lportance to the community, or a particular subset of the
community, that is greater than its role as ineyitab•e influencer and
determiner of vocational advancement. If one believes that another
interpreter cannot err in certain of his statements, then one would
never reach an interpretation contrary to a position of his that is
stated infallibly. Short of this deference, one may accord heavy
weight to interpretations within the church community, believing
that the community is strongly guided by the Holy Spirit. One may
doubt one's own judgment if it is opposed to those prevailing in the
Church; because of this, or for reasons of church loyalty, one might
choose not to publicize one's views. Thus, the interpretative community, or ·parts of it, may have an authoritative significance for the
theological interpreter that is qualitatively different from the authority of a community of literary critics. Just what this authority
is will depend on theological perspectives that themselves are influenced by one's interpretation of the religiously authoritative text.

c.

The Interpreter's Authority

One aspect of my argument is that some interpreters carry an
authority for their audience that is not present in literary interpretation. A literary critic relies upon the force of his analysis, the depth
of his insight, and the eloquence of his expression.· No doubt, some
critics get reputations as wise men or women, and if a particular
reader has found a critic's past interpretations insightful, he may be
inclined to credit a subsequent one. Therefore, a critic may have
authority that does not derive solely from his comments on a particular occasion. But religious interpreters may have authority that
depends on theological premises, not past success .or individual
character. The two most notable examples perhaps are the original
writers of books of the Bible and the Pope. If one believes that each
part of the Bible correctly indicates God's nature, then St. Paul's
135. Demonstrating· the errors of one's contemporaries may be a very important
part of one's task.
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interpretations of Jesus's message that are in the letters of his in the
New Testament take on infallible authority (though they must, of
course, themselves be interpreted). If one thinks the Pope is infallible when speaking ex cathedra, and the Pope renders an interpretation of the Bible while speaking in this way, then bis interpretation
will be infallibly correct 136 (though it must be interpreted). Among
some Protestants, a minister or other interpret~r may be viewed as
nothing more than an expert on religious questions but with no status intrinsically different from that of ordinary ~hri~tians. In ~hat
event, the authority of the minister's interpretation will resemble
that of the literary critic. But many Christians, Protestant and
Catholic, believe that priests and ministers, or a community of interpreters, are inspired by God in a way that they as individuals are
not; then interpretations by these persons may carry an extra power
that would not be accorded the same interpretation made by a
gifted individual layperson.
The special status religious believers accord a biblical text that
is being interpreted affects the import of interpretations. Once
someone accepts a particular biblical interpr~tation as correct on a
question that does not permit multiple answers, the interpretation
has very powerful implications for what he should believe and how
he should live.
3.

Legal Interpretation
a.

The Authority of Legal Materials and the Interpretive
Community

The subject of authority and legal interpretation is highly complex. The authoritativeness of many legal norms resembles the authoritativeness of the Bible to those who take the view that all parts
of the Bible reveal God's will, but this assertion can be understood
only with close attention to various subtleties and critical differences between authoritative legal norms and that view of biblical
authority.
I have noted that many rules of law lack a single authoritative
formulation. Working rules of the common law and constitutional
law do not have a single "canonical" formulation as do statutes and
constitutional provisions themselves, and as does the Bible under
the view that every passage contains the infallible truth. An actor
or court cannot always point to an exact set of words as the test of
136. The doctrine of Papal infallibility raises this possibility, however rarely statements to which the doctrine applies may have been biblical interpretations.
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whether behavior is legally permitted. 137 And, as,,we have seen in
connection with the ordinance about leashing dogs in the park,. a
rule that is otherwise applicable can be subject to cancellation in the
particular instance if the conduct is privileged or the rule is invalid
under some higher legal standard_.
Courts in the United States may overturn some rules without
relying on particular superior norms. A court confronted with a
rule of common law can ove.rrule it, if it is judged· to be misguided,
and courts also may have some authority to decide that statutes that
have long fain unenforced are no longer effective. Further, a court
may have some discretion in not penalizing those whose conduct
amounts to a violation of law overall. But in the absence of exercising such discretion, a court considering Olive's case'is bound to apply the ordinance;· It cannot say a recently adopted and actively
enforced rule requiring leashing is invalid. This conclusion rests
partly on the premise that courts are bound to apply legislative directives that have no defect and are actively enforced.
Not all standards of law are of the sort on which I have concentrated so far. Some are simply reasons for a decision that weigh
in one direction but. can be outweighed by other factors. Thus, the
principle that "penal statutes should be strictly construed" may be
considered in an interpretation of a criminal provision, but strong
reasons may lead a court not to interpret a particular provision as
the more strict of two plausible altematives. 138 Indeed, the same
standard could be the source of both ordinary rules and factors to
be weighed in decisions. As I have suggested, the establishment
clause may both forbid a_ nationally established church, and be understood to support a more general standard against government
classification of employment among groups defined in terms not directly relevant to employment p:urposes. 139 This pri~ciple would be
a reason not to allow employment discrimination in favor of blacks,
137. As I have said, it does not follow that the norms are invariably indeterminate.
Suppose that when Sam joined the firm, three different superiors told him that strong
firm policy was that office doors should be kept shut except when people are entering or
leaving the offices. One day a few weeks later when the air conditioner is operating full
blast, he takes a two hour lunch and neglects to shut his door on the way out. Though
the rule has never been formulated in one authoritative version and though Sam cannot
even recall the exact words each superior used, he can be as sure that he failed to comply as if a firm rule in canonical language had been circulated.
138. The distinction betwe¢n a rule with exceptions .and factors that must be
weighed can be thin indeed.
139. The intermediate stage in reasoning might be that the clause forbids religious
classifications of employment by the government even when a classification would favor
members of a religious group that had previously suffered discrimination.
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but countervailing reasons might lead a court (and should lead a
court, in my view) to determine that such classifications are
permissible.
Within the general parameters of what I have said, substantial
disagreement may exist about how far a present interpreter should
be guided by the linguistic implications and value judgments of
those who have established legal standards and how far he should
be guided by the judgments of some ·contemporary interpretive
community or by his own judgment about what is best. Such questions do not arise in this form for the person who thinks each passage of the Bible infallibly reveals the will of God. That person may
wonder how much.credence to give to prior or contemporary interpretations, and how much latitude to accord changing social conditions in figuring out God's will, but he will not self-consciously set
up "God's judgment" as something that might possibly be overcome by "the judgments of contemporaries" or "my judgment." A
judge who thinks a legislature was grossly ill-informed or that
events have rendered outdated its perspective of twenty years ago
may think in precisely those terms. Law is a human and complex
contrivance; disagreement exists over just how much latitude judges
have.
Finally, to reiterate a point made earlier, for the citizen, the
police officer, and the judge, the law is not the final word about
what should be done. A person is unlikely to say, "This is what
God wants but it's not the right thing to do overall." The law lacks
this kind of authoritativeness. All may recognize that driving an
escaped slave in a cart for two hundred miles across a state line
violates the laws against aiding fugitive slaves, but the citizen may
nonetheless believe he should do just that, the law enforcement official may believe he should tum his head, and a judge might decide
he should refuse to find the obvious facts that would lead to the
citizen's conviction and to the return of the slave. 140
In all of the ways I have noted, legal materials may have an
authority that varies from someone's understanding of a biblical
mandate. Still, they have an authority because they are part of the
law and that is quite different from any authority that exists in literary or historical interpretation.
140. Sanford Levinson recalls Edward Randolph's words at the Philadelphia Convention proposing the new constitution: "There are great seasons when persons with
limited powers are justified in exceeding them, and a person would be contemptible not
to risk it." Levinson, supra note 105, at 389 (footnote omitted).
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The Authority of the Judicial Interpreter

Within a legal system, the authority for judges of the interpretive community is intertwined with the authority of judges in our
political system. A legal system is an order for regulating affairs,
and the law of the state typically includes coercive force as a critical
element. A legal system fundamentally concerns action, not enlightepment; reasoning within the law is a form of practical reason
leading to narrow decisions, not reflection for the sake of understanding. In this respect, legal interpretation is notably different in
emphasis from interpretation in the human sciences and literary interpretation. When judges interpret the law, they decide whether or
not the coercion of the state will be employed to achieve a particular
objective. The judge has an authority that other modem interpreters lack; the individual who loses must act as the court indicates
whether or not he is persuaded and whether he has any inkling
about the content of the interpretative judgment. 141 Theological interpretation that leads to excommunication or shunning is somewhat similar in this respect, but the modem church cannot dictate
imprisonment or fines. It has power in the human realm only to
sever connections with those who seek to maintain them.
In our legal system, judges not only have the power to dispose
of cases; one of the premises of our system is that their interpretations are authoritative bases for future interpretations. General discourse about law, including the expressed views of teachers and
scholars and others who talk or write about the law but do not have
on that occasion the power and authority to decide, 142 may function
like historical writing or literary interpretation, but judicial interpretations in decisions have a special authority. Since what judges
say and decide can be rejected explicitly in subsequent cases for
good enough reasons, a judicial interpretation does not have the infallible authority attributed by some to the interpretations of the life
of Jesus in St. Paul's biblical letters, but strong reasons are required
to reject a prior interpretation. Because it is expressed in a case, an
interpretation has some force that does not depend wholly on either
141. Owen Fiss talks of the judge as speaking with the authority of the Pope. Fiss,

supra note 113, at 755. Of course, literary and historical interpreters judge the work of
other interpreters, and these judgments may determine who is employed and who is not,
but these are comparable to judgments of competence by an employer; they do not
represent a determination of wrongdoing to be followed by a prescribed remedy against
someone who would prefer to have nothing to do with the courts.
142. This includes discourse by judges off the bench.

84

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

its intrinsic persuasiveness as compared with alternatives or on the
reputation or general abilities of the judges who made it. 143
In a system in which so much depends upon decisions and in
which a judge's power is considerable, it is not surprising that
judges act under strong constraints. 144 Some of these, like the rule
in the federal constitution that judges must enforce the Constitution
and federal statutes against conflicting state law, 145 are reduced to
canonical formulation, but most are not. The doctrine of precedent
is, of course, a constraint on subsequent judges. So is the notion
that judges should not deviate too far from values and reasons reflected in the entire corpus of law or from the values of the community. As normative constraints on how a judge interprets, these
conventions have two qualities that critically distinguish their influence from the way in which convention may restrain in literary or
historical interpretation.
The most important quality is that individuals and organizations build up expectations on the basis of the system. These are
not just subjective expectancies of which interpretations will occur,
such as "I imagine that if Yale hired her, she's a deconstructionist";
they are the types of expectations on which people rely in planning
their lives. Encouraging and satisfying such expectations is a powerful aspect of any legal system. A judge who disregards basic legal
conventions is not only surprising and disappointing his fellow interpreters and reducing his opportunity for respect and advancement within the law, he is failing to meet his institutionalized role of
satisfying the justified expectations of those who are subject to the
law's coercion.
Of course, this analysis is somewhat circular. If it were understood that judges were really free to do virtually anything, then
however predictable their behavior might be, perhaps no one justifiably could rely on their acting in the predicted way. 146 But that
system is not the system of law in the United States, which recognizes the value of having justified expectations and places considerable stock in their satisfaction. The achievement of that v:ilue has
143. These matters will, however, influence the amount of its force for subsequent

cases.
144. See generally Fiss, supra note 113; Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
177 (1985).
145. U.S. CONST., art. VI.
146. People then would be in the position of a couple who has been invited to a
party each year but knows that the hosts are free not to invite them this year.
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much to do with aspects of the law that render determinate answers
feasible.
I tum now to a closely related quality of the restraining conventions mentioned in previous sections. Since no one has to be a
judge, those who assume official positions implicitly agree to perform the duties of those positions, and all judges actually take an
oath of office to this effect. Those oaths amount to a promise to
perform somewhere within the broad realm of the powers that
judges are understood to have in our legal system. As I have already urged, a promise to fulfill a role carries weight for whether
one should, overall, perform the acts that fulfill the role.
No doubt there is room for much argument about the best conception of a judge's role, and no doubt this conception can shift
significantly over time. A judge may self-consciously act upon a
conception that is in some respects accepted only by a minority.
But there are limits. If, now, in a state without a death penalty, a
trial judge who is about to sentence a convicted murderer simply
pulls out a gun, says "here is what you deserve," and shoots and
kills the murderer, he has acted illegally. By failing to adhere to
basic norms that define his role within the legal system, he has performed an act that is determinately, objectively, wrong under the
law, and he has violated his promise to fulfill the judge's role.
CONCLUSION

I have explained why many legal questions have determinate
answers, in the sense of answers (1) that virtually all lawyers would
reach upon understanding the legal questions and (2) that are unopposed by any powerful contrary arguments consonant with the
"ground rules" of the legal enterprise. Although I have more confidence in the nonlegal and legal illustrations I have provided than in
any abstract formulation, my conclusions can be summed up in this
way:
The application or nonapplication of an authoritative rule or
broader'standard can be determinate if:
·
(1) that outcome is indicated by the literal meaning of the standard and no serious reason for different treatment appears in (a)
other relevant authoritative standards, (b) the relevant purposes
of those involved in the system of which the standard is a part, or
(c) the understandings of those who adopted the standard, those
who now apply it, or those who are now subject to it; or
(2) despite the absence of a relevant literal meaning, the import
of other standards and/or the relevant understandings of those
involved in the system of which the standard is a part plainly
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indicate a result, and no serious relevant reason appears to the
contrary._
.

In order for the formulation _to apply to common law standards and
other judicially established rules or broader standards of law, the
outcome must be the same under each plausible formulation of the
standard. (In this formulation, rules are one kind of standard, the
kind that is relatively precise in its coverage.)
I have further suggested important similarities and differences
between legal and other constructive interpretation. No sensible
understanding of the interpretive process undercuts the conclusion
that many legal questions have determinate answers.

